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INTRODUCTION 
At the center of our national culture is the belief that every Amer-
ican should own a home, the so-called “American dream.”1  Yet, dur-
ing the recent financial crisis, our nation experienced the worst dis-
placement of Americans out of their homes since the Great 
Depression.2  Thus, it is important to objectively understand what 
contributed to the crisis and what did not.  Some have used the fi-
nancial crisis to promote changes in the long-standing doctrine of 
federal preemption.  These proponents have argued that federal 
preemption of state laws resulted in the financial crisis and reform 
legislation was needed.3  For example, then Governor of New York El-
iot Spitzer argued that the federal government used preemption “in 
an unprecedented assault on state legislatures, as well as on state at-
torneys general and anyone else on the side of consumers.”4  Accord-
ing to Mr. Spitzer, the use of preemption made the federal govern-
ment “a willing accomplice to the lenders” engaged in the predatory 
lending that ultimately resulted in the subprime mortgage crisis.5 
Congress responded with the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”).6  The Dodd-Frank Act 
made sweeping reforms to the financial world in an effort “[t]o pro-
mote the financial stability of the United States” in the wake of the 
financial crisis.7  Financial institutions are now subject to a myriad of 
 
 1 Anthony DePalma, Why Owning a Home is the American Dream, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1988, at 
RP5. 
 2 BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., THE U.S. HOUSING MARKET:  CURRENT 
CONDITIONS AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 1, 3 (2012) (explaining that, since 2006, “an 
unprecedented number of households have lost, or are on the verge of losing, their 
homes,” and that the decline in housing prices between 2007 and 2009 was “unprece-
dented since the Great Depression”).  
 3 See Office of Thrift Supervision Integration, Dodd-Frank Act Implementation, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 43,549, 43,553 (July 21, 2011) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Implementation]  (objecting 
to preemption of state and local laws). 
 4 Eliot Spitzer, Predatory Lenders’ Partner in Crime, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 2008, at A25.   
 5 Id. 
 6 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 
Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act] (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.). 
 7 Id. pmbl. 
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new laws.8  One of the areas of reform concerns federal preemption 
for national banks and federal thrifts.9  This Article will examine the 
doctrine of federal preemption in the banking realm and whether 
federal preemption did, in fact, contribute to the financial crisis. 
This Article will first explore the basic framework of the doctrine 
of preemption in the context of banking.  Part I will begin by discuss-
ing the judicial constructs of preemption law in banking, including 
an examination of the seminal case of Barnett Bank of Marion County, 
N.A. v. Nelson.10  In Part II, this Article will provide a critical examina-
tion of how the Dodd-Frank Act maintained some of these judicial 
constructs and altered others.  While this Article analyzes the impact 
of these changes on the doctrine of preemption, the overall effect of 
these provisions is yet to be realized. 
In Part III, this Article will then examine whether federal preemp-
tion contributed to the financial crisis.  Those in opposition to feder-
al preemption have argued that federal preemption prevented states 
from regulating and enforcing state laws against national banks and 
federal thrifts, and this lack of regulation and enforcement resulted 
in the subprime mortgage crisis and the financial crisis.11  Based on 
independent data and an analysis of the preemption doctrine, this 
Article will argue that federal preemption did not contribute to the 
crises. 
Finally, in Part IV, this Article will examine the benefits versus the 
costs of eliminating federal preemption and requiring national banks 
and federal thrifts to comply with the varying laws of fifty states.  
Based on this analysis, this Article will argue that the costs of eliminat-
ing federal preemption far outweigh the supposed benefits. 
I.  FEDERAL PREEMPTION 
The Supremacy Clause provides that federal law “shall be the su-
preme [l]aw” of the United States, notwithstanding any contrary state 
 
 8 See, e.g., id. §§ 601–628, 124 Stat. at 1596–641 (Bank and Savings Association Holding 
Company and Depository Institution Regulatory Improvements Act of 2010) (codified in 
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.); see also id. §§ 1400–98, 124 Stat. at 2136–212 (Mortgage 
Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act) (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.). 
 9 See 12 U.S.C. §§ 25b, 1465 (2012).  
 10 Barnett Bank of Marion Cnty., N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996). 
 11 See Joseph R. Mason et al., The Economic Impact of Eliminating Preemption of State Consumer 
Protection Laws, 12  U. PA. J. BUS. L. 781, 790 (2010) (“[C]ritics of preemption continue to 
push three main arguments, including blaming federal regulation for the subprime crisis, 
alleging that federal regulation has been lax, and that preemption threatens the banking 
market’s stability.”). 
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law.12  Therefore, within constitutional bounds, the federal govern-
ment has the authority and power to preempt state law.13  The follow-
ing Subpart will analyze the doctrine of federal preemption in the 
context of banking. 
A.  Preemption in the Banking Context 
 The doctrine of preemption starts with an initial inquiry:  whether 
Congress, in promulgating a specific statute, intended the federal law 
to preempt state law.14  If a court finds such congressional intent “to 
set aside the laws” of a state, then the “Supremacy Clause requires” 
the court to uphold the federal law, and the state law will be 
preempted.15  In the context of banking, the Supreme Court has held 
that national banks “are governed in their daily course of business” by 
certain kinds of state law, including laws with respect to contracts, 
purchase and sale of property, debt collections, and liability for debts 
owed by banks.16  In other matters, the law of preemption generally 
follows three basic principles:  (i) express preemption, (ii) implied or 
field preemption, and (iii) conflict preemption.17 
 
 12 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 360–61 (1819) 
(“The 6th article of the constitution of the United States, declares, that the laws made in 
pursuance of it, ‘shall be the supreme law of the land, any thing in the constitution, or laws 
of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.’ By this declaration, the States are prohibit-
ed from passing any acts which shall be repugnant to a law of the United States.”). 
 13 See RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL ET AL., THE LAW OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
92, 95 (4th ed. 2009) (“Within constitutional limits, Congress has supreme authority . . . . 
Congress has very broad authority to regulate national banks, federal savings institutions, 
and federal credit unions and to preempt any inconsistent state law.”). 
 14 Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 30 (“Th[e] question [of preemption] is basically one of congres-
sional intent.”); Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 280 (1987) (“In de-
termining whether a state statute is pre-empted by federal law and therefore invalid un-
der the Supremacy Clause . . . our sole task is to ascertain the intent of Congress.”); Fid. 
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n. v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152 (1982) (“The pre-emption doc-
trine, which has its roots in the Supremacy Clause, requires us to examine congressional 
intent.” (citation omitted)); Wells Fargo Bank of Tex., N.A. v. James, 321 F.3d 488, 491 
(5th Cir. 2003) (explaining that “our paramount concern is to effectuate the intent of 
Congress” when determining whether a state law is preempted). 
 15 Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 30. 
 16 Nat’l Bank v. Commonwealth, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 353, 362 (1869); see also 12 C.F.R. 
§§7.4007(c), 7.4008(e) (2014) (providing that state laws with respect to contracts, torts, 
criminal law, rights to collect debts, acquisition and transfer of property, taxation, and 
zoning “apply to national banks to the extent consistent with the decision of the Supreme 
Court in Barnett Bank of Marion Cnty., N.A. v. Nelson”). 
 17 Baptista v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 640 F.3d 1194, 1197 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 
132 S. Ct. 253 (2011); James, 321 F.3d at 491; Bank of Am. v. City of S.F., 309 F.3d 551, 558 
(9th Cir. 2002); Am. Bankers Ass’n v. Lockyer, 239 F. Supp. 2d 1000, 1007 (E.D. Cal. 
2002); Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 226 (2000). 
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 Express preemption can be analyzed in the forms of express statu-
tory preemption, express regulatory preemption, and express 
nonpreemption.18  Express statutory preemption occurs when a valid 
federal statute explicitly states that it preempts state law.19  In this in-
stance, the courts will follow the express congressional intent.20  The 
particular federal law will govern, and the state law purporting to ap-
ply to the bank will be preempted.21  A bank subject to the federal law 
will need to comply only with the federal law; the state law is not ap-
plicable to the bank.22 
Express regulatory preemption occurs when a federal regulation 
explicitly states that it preempts state law.23  Courts have found that 
federal regulations have the same preemptive effect as federal stat-
utes.24  Moreover, a “pre-emptive regulation’s force does not depend 
on express congressional authority” to preempt state law.25  The basic 
analysis in this regard is whether the regulatory body was acting with-
in its regulatory authority in promulgating the regulation, and 
whether the regulation is a reasonable interpretation of federal law 
 
 18 See CARNELL ET AL., supra note 13, at 94. 
 19 See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1831d(a) (2012) (“In order to prevent discrimination against State-
chartered insured depository institutions, . . . with respect to interest rates, if the applica-
ble rate prescribed in this section exceeds the rate such State bank . . . would be permit-
ted to charge . . . such State bank . . . may, notwithstanding any State constitution or stat-
ute which is hereby preempted . . . charge on any loan . . . .”); Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 
31; Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 479 U.S. at 280; de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 152–53; Jones v. 
Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 530–31 (1977); James, 321 F.3d at 491; Bank of Am., 309 
F.3d at 558; Am. Bankers Ass’n, 239 F. Supp. 2d at 1007. 
 20 Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 30 (explaining that if Congress intended the federal statute to 
preempt state law, then “the Supremacy Clause requires courts to follow federal, not state 
law”). 
 21 de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 152–53 (noting that preemption is “compelled” when the con-
gressional intent is “explicitly stated in the statute’s language” (quoting Jones, 430 U.S. at 
525)). 
 22 CARNELL ET AL., supra note 13, at 94. 
 23 See de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 147 (explaining that federal thrift associations “shall not be 
bound by or subject to any conflicting State law which imposes different . . . due-on-sale 
requirements” (quoting 41 Fed. Reg. 18,296, 18,287 (May 3, 1976))).  The current feder-
al regulation provides for a “permanent preemption of state prohibitions on the exercise 
of due-on-sale clauses” by both federal savings associations and state-chartered thrift insti-
tutions.  Preemption of State Due-On-Sale Laws, 12 C.F.R. § 591.1 (2002). 
 24 de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 153; Blum v. Bacon, 457 U.S. 132, 145–46 (1982) (finding a state 
law invalid under the Supremacy Clause because it conflicts with a valid federal regula-
tion); Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46, 60 (1981) (holding that the “controlling provi-
sions” of the federal regulation “prevail over and displace inconsistent state law”); United 
States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 381 (1961) (finding a federal regulation “displace[d] in-
consistent state law”). 
 25 de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 154.  
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and not an abuse of regulatory discretion.26  If a court finds express 
regulatory preemption exists, then a bank subject to the federal regu-
lation will need to comply only with the federal regulation; the state 
law is similarly not applicable to the bank.27 
Express nonpreemption can occur when the federal statute or 
regulation explicitly provides that it does not preempt state law.28  As 
a result, both the federal law or regulation (as the case may be) and 
the state law would be applicable to the bank.29  As a practical matter, 
the bank must comply with the stricter of the two.30  For example, if 
the federal law is stricter, then effectively, the bank would have to 
comply with that law.31 
If an express statutory or regulatory preemption (or express 
nonpreemption) does not exist, then the analysis becomes whether 
the federal statute reveals an implicit intent by Congress to preempt 
state law.32  Thus, state law can be preempted by implication.  Courts 
will consider whether the “nonspecific statutory language” or the 
“structure and purpose” of the federal statute clearly indicates an im-
plicit intent to preempt state law.33  For example, the federal law may 
indicate a clear intent to occupy that entire field of law.34  This form 
 
 26 Id. at 153–54 (“Where Congress has directed an administrator to exercise his discretion, 
his judgments are subject to judicial review only to determine whether he has exceeded 
his statutory authority or acted arbitrarily.”); Shimer, 367 U.S. at 383 (“If [the administra-
tor’s] choice represents a reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies that were 
committed to the agency’s care by the statute, we should not disturb it unless it appears 
from the statute or its legislative history that the accommodation is not one that Congress 
would have sanctioned.”); see also Blum, 457 U.S. at 145–46 (“The [federal administra-
tor’s] decision to apply the [federal] regulation . . . is eminently reasonable and deserves 
judicial deference.”); Ridgway, 454 U.S. at 57 (finding that there had “been no suggestion 
that these regulations are unreasonable, unauthorized, or inconsistent with the [federal 
statute]”). 
 27 CARNELL ET AL., supra note 13, at 94. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. 
 30 See id. (“One law is more stringent than another if it prohibits more, requires more, or 
allows less.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 31 Id. 
 32 Barnett Bank of Marion Cnty., N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 31 (1996); see Fid. Fed. Sav. & 
Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152–53 (1983) (“Pre-emption may be either ex-
press or implied . . . .”). 
 33 Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 31 (quoting Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 
(1977)); de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 152–53 (quoting Jones, 430 U.S. at 525). 
 34 Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 31; see de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 153 (“[A] scheme of federal regu-
lation [created by the federal statute] may be so pervasive as to make reasonable the in-
ference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it, because the Act of 
Congress may touch a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal 
system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject . . . .” 
(quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)) (internal quotation 
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of preemption is referred to as field preemption.35  Prior to the Dodd-
Frank Act, some courts viewed the Home Owners’ Loan Act 
(“HOLA”), the federal statute which provides for the chartering and 
regulation of federal savings associations,36 as occupying the field with 
respect to such institutions.37 
If an express statutory or regulatory preemption does not exist, 
and there does not appear to be any implication that the federal law 
occupies a particular field of law, then the analysis turns to whether 
the state statute conflicts with the federal law.38  This type of preemp-
tion is known as conflict preemption.39  Courts may find conflict 
preemption when the federal law and the state law are in “irreconcil-
able conflict.”40  For instance, conflict preemption may be found 
when it would be physically impossible for the bank to comply with 
both the federal law and the state law.41  For example, a state law may 
provide that all banks in the state must open by 8:00 a.m., and a fed-
eral law might provide that national banks may not open until 9:00 
a.m.  It would be a physical impossibility for a national bank located 
 
marks omitted)); Wells Fargo Bank of Tex., N.A. v. James, 321 F.3d 488, 491 (5th Cir. 
2003). 
 35 Bank of Am. v. City of S.F., 309 F.3d 551, 558 (9th Cir. 2002); Am. Bankers Ass’n v. Lock-
yer, 239 F. Supp. 2d 1000, 1007–08 (E.D. Cal. 2002); Nelson, supra note 17, at 227. 
 36 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461–1470 (2012). 
 37 See Meyers v. Beverly Hills Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 499 F.2d 1145, 1147 (9th Cir. 1974) 
(“[F]ederal law preempts the field of prepayments of real estate loans to federally char-
tered savings and loan associations, so that any California law in the area is inapplicable 
to federal savings and loan associations . . . operating within California.”); California v. 
Coast Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 98 F. Supp. 311, 318 (S.D. Cal. 1951) (stating that the 
Home Owners’ Loan Act “embrace[s] the entire field” and that it is thus “clear that Con-
gress has preempted the field, making invalid the state statutes plaintiffs rely up-
on . . . when attempted to be invoked against a Federal savings and loan association”); see 
also First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Wis. v. Loomis, 97 F.2d 831, 834 (7th Cir. 1938) (af-
firming the finding of the district court that “the plaintiff is a corporation organized and 
existing pursuant to and by virtue of [the Home Owners’ Loan] Act . . . and that as a 
Federal savings and loan association it is under the sole authority and control of the laws 
of the United States”). 
 38 Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 31; de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 153; Bank of Am., 309 F.3d at 558. 
 39 Am. Bankers Ass’n, 239 F. Supp. 2d at 1008 ; Nelson, supra note 17, at 227–28. 
 40 Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 31 (quoting Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 659 
(1982)); Wells Fargo Bank of Tex., 321 F.3d at 491; Am. Bankers Ass’n, 239 F. Supp. 2d at 
1008. 
 41 See Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 31 (declaring physical impossibility to be an “irreconcilable 
conflict”); de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 153 (“[S]tate law is nullified to the extent that it actual-
ly conflicts with federal law.  Such a conflict arises when ‘compliance with both ‘federal 
and state regulations is a physical impossibility . . . .’’” (quoting Fla. Lime & Avocado 
Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43 (1963)); Bank of Am., 309 F.3d at 558; Am. 
Bankers Ass’n, 239 F. Supp. 2d at 1008 (“[A]ctual conflict arises when simultaneous com-
pliance with state and federal law is a physical impossibility . . . .” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
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in this state to comply with both the federal law and the state law.  
Conflict preemption also may be found when the state law is an ob-
stacle to the accomplishment of the purposes and objectives of the 
federal law.42  This form of conflict preemption is referred to as ob-
stacle preemption.43  Thus, obstacle preemption can occur when the 
state law is inconsistent with the federal law, or the state law interferes 
with federal policy.44 
The principles of conflict preemption continue to apply even 
when the state law is particularly important to the state.45  For exam-
ple, in Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, despite ac-
knowledging that “real property law is a matter of special concern” to 
a state, the Supreme Court held that a federal regulation permitting 
federal savings and loan associations to enforce due-on-sale clauses in 
mortgage loans preempted a conflicting state law.46  Moreover, as the 
Supreme Court indicated in de la Cuesta, a conflict with state law may 
be found when a federal law or regulation provides permission to 
take certain actions, such as permitting federal savings and loan asso-
ciations to include and enforce a due-on-sale provision in their mort-
gage agreements, but does not require that those actions be taken.47  
Similarly, preemption may be found when it is possible for a national 
bank to comply with both the federal and the state laws; however, the 
state laws “infringe the national banking laws or impose an undue 
burden on the performance of the banks’ functions.”48  In addition, 
preemption may occur if the state law “frustrates the purpose 
 
 42 Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 31; de la Cuesta,458 U.S. at 153; Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 
U.S. 519, 526 (1977); Bethlehem Steel Co. v. N.Y. State Labor Relations Bd., 330 U.S. 767, 
773 (1947); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941); Bank of Am., 309 F.3d at 558; Am. 
Bankers Ass’n, 239 F. Supp. 2d at 1008. 
 43 Nelson, supra note 17, at 228–29. 
 44 See id. (stating that obstacle preemption may be found both when “state and federal law 
contradict each other” and when “the effects of state law will hinder accomplishment of 
the purposes behind federal law”); see also CARNELL ET AL., supra note 13, at 94 (discussing 
the key question of whether “the state law interfere[s] with the policy of the federal law” 
(emphasis omitted)). 
 45 de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 153 (“The relative importance to the State of its own law is not 
material when there is a conflict with a valid federal law . . . .” (quoting Free v. Bland, 369 
U.S. 663, 666 (1962))); Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46, 54–55 (1981). 
 46 de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 153, 159. 
 47 Id. at 155 (“The conflict does not evaporate because the . . . regulation simply permits, 
but does not compel, federal savings and loans to include due-on-sale clauses in their 
contracts and to enforce those provisions when the security property is transferred.”). 
 48 Ass’n of Banks in Ins. v. Duryee, 270 F.3d 397, 404 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting Anderson 
Nat’l Bank v. Luckett 321 U.S. 233, 248 (1944)). 
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of . . . national legislation, or impairs the efficiencies of . . . agencies 
of the federal government” to carry out their responsibilities.49 
Moreover, the principles of conflict preemption in banking are 
not hindered by a presumption against preemption.  The presump-
tion against preemption “rests on the assumption that Congress did 
not intend to supplant state law.”50  As the Supreme Court has ex-
plained, when Congress legislates in a field which has been “tradi-
tionally occupied” by the states, courts “start with the assumption that 
the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by 
the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of 
Congress.”51  However, a presumption against preemption “is not 
triggered when the State regulates in an area where there has been a 
history of significant federal presence.”52  “National banking is the 
paradigmatic example.”53  Thus, “because there has been a ‘history of 
significant federal presence’ in national banking, the presumption 
against preemption of state law is inapplicable.”54 
B.  Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson 
The seminal case in the preemption law of banking is Barnett Bank 
of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson, in which the Supreme Court ad-
dressed the issue of whether a federal bank statute and a Florida state 
statute were in “irreconcilable conflict.”55  The facts and the Supreme 
Court’s analysis of the case are worth discussing in detail, especially in 
light of the preeminence of this case in subsequent case law and con-
 
 49 Am. Bankers Ass’n v. Lockyer, 239 F. Supp. 2d 1000, 1008 (E.D. Cal. 2002) (quoting 
McClellan v. Chipman, 164 U.S. 347, 357 (1896)). See also Wells Fargo Bank of Tex., N.A. 
v. James, 321 F.3d 488, 491 (5th Cir. 2003); Bank of Am. v. City of S.F., 309 F.3d 551, 561 
(9th Cir. 2002) (citing First Nat’l Bank of San Jose v. California, 262 U.S. 366, 369 
(1923)). 
 50 Bank of Am., 309 F.3d at 558. 
 51 Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). 
 52 United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000); see also Robert S. Peck, A Separation-of-
Powers Defense of the “Presumption Against Preemption,” 84 TUL. L. REV. 1185, 1195 (2010) 
(“The presumption does not apply where there has been a history of significant federal 
presence . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 53 Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, 557 U.S. 519, 554 (2009) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 54 Bank of Am., 309 F.3d at 559 (quoting Locke, 529 U.S. at 108).  See also Wachovia Bank v. 
Burke, 414 F.3d 305, 314 (2d Cir. 2005) (“The presumption against federal preemption 
disappears, however, in fields of federal regulation that have been substantially occupied 
by federal authority for an extended period of time.  Regulation of federally chartered 
banks is one such area.” (quoting Flagg v. Yonkers Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 396 F.3d 178, 183 
(2d Cir. 2005)). 
 55 Barnett Bank of Marion Cnty., N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 31 (1996). 
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gressional statutes.56  The federal statute at issue in the case, 12 U.S.C. 
§ 92, granted to national banks the power to sell insurance in small 
towns, specifically those towns that do not exceed 5,000 people.57  
The federal statute provided in relevant part that a national bank 
located and doing business in any place the population of which does not 
exceed five thousand inhabitants . . . may, under such rules and regula-
tions as may be prescribed by the Comptroller of the Currency, act as the 
agent for any fire, life, or other insurance company authorized by the au-
thorities of the State . . . to do business in [that] State, by soliciting and 
selling insurance . . . .58 
The Florida statute provided that a bank may sell insurance in these 
small towns; however, such a bank may not be a subsidiary of a hold-
ing company.59  Barnett Bank was a subsidiary of a holding company.60 
The Court acknowledged that the two statutes do not directly con-
flict, which would be the case if the federal statute required national 
banks to sell insurance and the state law prohibited national banks 
from selling insurance.61  This hypothetical circumstance would be a 
case of physical impossibility.62  Instead, the Court considered wheth-
er the state statute, which prohibited a national bank that is a subsidi-
ary of a holding company from selling insurance in these small towns, 
“st[ood] as an obstacle to the accomplishment” of one of the purpos-
es of the federal statute.63  In effect, the Court considered whether 
conflict preemption applied.64 
The state of Florida argued that the federal statute is limited to 
only those circumstances where a contrary state law does not exist.65  
Thus, the Court considered whether the literal language of the fed-
 
 56 See 12 U.S.C § 25b(b)(1)(B)–(C) (2012) (citing to Barnett Bank); 15 U.S.C. 
§ 6701(d)(2)(A) (2012) (codifying the Supreme Court’s decision in Barnett Bank barring 
any state from preventing insurance sales where it is otherwise authorized by federal law); 
Ass’n of Banks in Ins. v. Duryee, 270 F.3d 397, 404–05 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Barnett Bank 
as the legal standard of preemption). 
 57 Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 28. 
 58 12 U.S.C. § 92 (2012). 
 59 Fla. Stat. § 626.988(2) (Supp. 1996). 
 60 Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 29. 
 61 Id. at 31. 
 62 See id. (describing the inability to comply with two conflicting statutes as a “physical im-
possibility”); Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul 373 U.S. 132, 142–143 (1963) 
(“[F]ederal exclusion of state law is inescapable and requires no inquiry into congres-
sional design where compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical im-
possibility for one engaged in interstate commerce.”). 
 63 Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 31 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. at 32 (“[T]he State of Florida and its supporting amici argue . . . that the Federal Stat-
ute grants national banks a permission that is limited to circumstances where state law is 
not to the contrary.”).  
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eral statute indicated a broad or a limited permission, and found that 
the plain language of the statute suggested a broad permission.66  The 
statute provided that national banks “may . . . act as the agent” for 
sales of insurance.67  Moreover, the federal statute was not qualified 
by any reference to state regulation with respect to the licensing of 
banks as insurance agents.68  The federal statute expressly provided 
that any “rules or regulations” governing a national bank’s sale of in-
surance would be prescribed by the Comptroller of the Currency.69  
In fact, the only reference to state regulation was limited to the li-
censing of insurance companies.70 
Further, the federal statute provided that the grant of authority to 
sell insurance is “in addition” to other powers granted to national 
banks.71  The Court explained that grants of “powers” to national 
banks, whether enumerated72 or incidental,73 historically have been 
interpreted “as grants of authority not normally limited by, but rather 
ordinarily pre-empting, contrary state law.”74  In a case where Con-
 
 66 Id. (“[T]he Federal Statute’s language suggests a broad, not a limited, permission.  That 
language says, without qualification, that national banks ‘may . . . act as the agent’ for in-
surance sales.” (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 92)).  
 67 12 U.S.C. § 92 (emphasis added); Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 32. 
 68 See 12 U.S.C. § 92; Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 32  (discussing that 12 U.S.C. § 92 only refers 
to state regulation in the context of “licensing—not of banks and insurance agents, but of 
the insurance companies whose policies the bank, as insurance agent, will sell”). 
 69 12 U.S.C. § 92. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Enumerated powers of national banks are those powers expressly granted to national 
banks by statute.  See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 24 (2012) (granting national banks the power to re-
ceive deposits and make loans); CARNELL ET AL., supra note 13, at 108 (explaining that a 
“bank’s authority depends on the analysis of the statutory text”). 
 73 Incidental powers of national banks are those powers that have been interpreted by the 
courts or the applicable Federal banking regulator to be incidental to the business of 
banking. See 12 U.S.C. § 24 (2012) (granting national banks the power “[t]o exer-
cise . . . all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of bank-
ing”); see also NationsBank of N.C. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 259 
(1995) (holding that the business of banking is not limited to the enumerated powers set 
forth in 12 U.S.C. § 24 and the Comptroller of the Currency has the discretion to author-
ize activities beyond those powers expressly set forth in the statute); CARNELL ET AL., supra 
note 13, at 108–09.  
 74 Barnett Bank of Marion Cnty., N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 32 (1996); see also Fid. Fed. 
Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 170 (1982) (holding that a federal regula-
tion permitting national banks to include a “due on sale” clause in mortgage agreements 
preempts a conflicting state statute prohibiting the acceleration of a debt upon sale of the 
property); Franklin Nat’l Bank of Franklin Square v. New York, 347 U.S. 373, 375–79 
(1954) (holding that a federal statute permitting national banks to accept savings depos-
its preempts a conflicting state statute prohibiting the use of the word “savings” in the ad-
vertising of certain state and national banks); First Nat’l Bank of San Jose v. California, 
262 U.S. 366, 368–69 (1923) (finding that national banks’ “power” to receive deposits 
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gress has explicitly granted a power to a national bank, the Court rea-
soned that Congress would not want the states to “forbid, or signifi-
cantly impair,” that power.75  In contrast, states continued to have the 
power to prescribe laws to regulate national banks where those state 
laws did not “prevent or significantly interfere” with the exercise by 
the national bank of the powers granted by federal authority.76 
The federal statute in this case explicitly granted a national bank 
the power to sell insurance.77  The federal statute did not expressly 
condition the exercise of that power upon state permission, and thus 
the federal statute contained no “indication” that it was Congress’s 
intent to subject that power to a state restriction.78 
The Court concluded that the word “may” in the federal statute 
should have a broad interpretation that did not condition the federal 
power upon state permission.79  Thus, the Court held that the federal 
statute granted national banks the power to sell insurance regardless 
of whether or not a state permitted banks to sell insurance.80  Under 
the “ordinary legal principles of pre[e]mption,” the state statute was 
preempted.81 
As further discussed in Part II.A, the Barnett decision continues to 
be the seminal case in the preemption law of banking.82  
 
preempts contrary state escheat law); Bank of Am. v. City of S.F., 309 F.3d 551, 555, 557–
60, 561–64 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that the National Bank Act preempts conflicting mu-
nicipal ordinances prohibiting the charging of ATM fees to non-depositors). 
 75 Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 33; Rose v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., 513 F.3d 1032, 1037 (9th Cir. 
2008); Bank of Am., 309 F.3d at 561. 
 76 Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 33; see also Anderson Nat’l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 247–52 
(1944) (holding that a state law requiring surrender of abandoned accounts was not an 
“unlawful encroachment on the rights and privileges of national banks”); McClennan v. 
Chipman, 164 U.S. 347, 358 (1896) (finding that a state statute prohibiting national 
banks from taking real estate from insolvent transferees would not “destroy[] or ham-
per[]” any of the functions of national banks); Nat’l Bank v. Commonwealth, 76 U.S. (9 
Wall.) 353, 362 (1869) (holding that national banks are not exempt from a state law that 
does not “interfere with, or impair the[] efficiency” of a national bank’s performance of 
its functions); Bank of Am. v. City of S.F., 309 F.3d 551, 558–59 (9th Cir. 2002) (“State 
regulation of banking is permissible when it does not prevent or significantly interfere 
with the national bank’s exercise of its powers.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 77 Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 34. 
 78 Id. at 34–35 (citing Franklin Nat’l Bank, 347 U.S. at 378). 
 79 Id. at 35 (citing Franklin Nat’l Bank, 347 U.S. at 343). 
 80 Id. at 37. 
 81 Id. at 28, 37–38 (holding that the ordinary rules of preemption, rather than the special 
McCarran-Ferguson anti-preemption rule, apply where the federal statute “specifically re-
lates to the business of insurance”).  
 82 Id. at 25; see infra Part II.A. 
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II.  THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND FEDERAL PREEMPTION 
 In the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress addressed the doctrine of feder-
al preemption in the banking realm.  This Part will first discuss the 
preemption standard provided in the statute. 
A.  The Preemption Standard 
 In the spirit of reform premised by the statute, the Dodd-Frank 
Act specifically addresses preemption with regard to State consumer 
financial laws.83  A “State consumer financial law” is a state law “that 
does not directly or indirectly discriminate against national banks and 
that directly and specifically regulates the manner, content, or terms 
and conditions of any financial transaction . . . with respect to a con-
sumer.”84  The Act’s preemption standard provides that a State con-
sumer financial law will be preempted only if one of the following 
three circumstances apply:  (i) the “application of a State consumer 
financial law would have a discriminatory effect on national banks” as 
compared to the effect of the law on state-chartered banks,85 (ii) the 
State consumer financial law “prevents or significantly interferes” 
with the national bank’s exercise of its powers “in accordance with 
the legal standard for preemption” in the Barnett decision,86 or (iii) 
the State consumer financial law is preempted by another federal 
law.87  Notably, with respect to national banks, the Dodd-Frank Act 
does not address preemption of state laws that do not meet the crite-
ria of a “State consumer financial law.”88  Thus, existing preemption 
standards would still apply to national banks with respect to those 
state laws.  Further, the Dodd-Frank Act expressly provides that the 
National Bank Act “does not occupy the field in any area of [s]tate 
law.”89 
In considering the preemption standard, it is evident Congress 
was concerned with discrimination against national banks.  As an ini-
tial matter, a state law will not fall within the scope of a “State con-
sumer financial law” if it directly or indirectly discriminates against 
 
 83 See 12 U.S.C. § 25b (2012)  (clarifying state law preemption standards for national banks 
and subsidiaries). 
 84 Id. § 25b(a)(2) . 
 85 Id. § 25b(b)(1)(A) . 
 86 Id. § 25b(b)(1)(B) . 
 87 Id. § 25b(b)(1)(C) . 
 88 Dodd-Frank Implementation, supra note 3, at 43,551 n.11;  see id. at 43,556 n.47 
(“[N]othing in Dodd-Frank affects the [Comptroller’s] authority to address preemption 
questions concerning laws other than ‘state consumer financial laws.’”). 
 89 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(4). 
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national banks.90  A state law that directly discriminates against na-
tional banks presumably would permit less or require more of a na-
tional bank than a state-chartered bank.  For example, if a state law 
required national banks to provide drive-up window service while 
state-chartered banks were not held to the same requirement, then 
the state law would directly discriminate against national banks.  Simi-
larly, if a state law required national banks to be closed on Saturdays 
but state-chartered banks were permitted to be open on Saturdays, 
then the state law would directly discriminate against national banks. 
A state law that indirectly discriminates against national banks is 
somewhat less obvious; however, one can imagine a circumstance in 
which the state law required borrowers of national banks to pay a two 
percent mortgage recordation tax while borrowers of state-chartered 
banks paid a mortgage recordation tax of only one percent of the 
loan amount.  In this example, the fee is paid by the borrower; thus, 
the state law indirectly discriminates against national banks by requir-
ing borrowers of national banks to pay higher fees than borrowers of 
state banks. 
If a state law “does not directly or indirectly discriminate against 
national banks” and “directly and specifically regulates the manner, 
content, or terms and conditions of any financial transaction” with a 
consumer, then the state law will be considered a “State consumer fi-
nancial law” under the statute.91  The analysis then turns to whether 
the state law may be preempted pursuant to one of the three prongs 
of the preemption standard. 
The first prong of the preemption standard, which may be aptly 
called “discriminatory effect preemption,” is a new standard for find-
ing preemption of a State consumer financial law.92  This prong pro-
vides that a State consumer financial law may be preempted, even if it 
 
 90 Id. § 25b(a)(2) . 
 91 Id. 
 92 Interpretive Letter No. 1132 from John Walsh, Acting Comptroller of the Currency, Of-
fice of the Comptroller of the Currency, to Sen. Thomas R. Carper, at 2 & n.5 (May 12, 
2011).  While discriminatory effect preemption is a new standard in the preemption of 
State consumer financial laws, the concern of a possible discriminatory effect against na-
tional banks has a long history in the usury laws of banking.  See, e.g., Tiffany v. Nat’l Bank 
of Mo., 85 U.S. 409, 413 (1873) (expressing a concern with “expos[ing] [national banks] 
to the hazard of unfriendly legislation by the States,” and thus holding that national 
banks may charge interest at the same rate as that permitted to be charged by state-
chartered banks, but if a higher rate is permitted to be charged by other lenders in the 
state, national banks may charge that higher rate); cf. 12 U.S.C. § 1831d(a) (2012) (per-
mitting insured state-chartered banks to charge the highest rate of interest permitted by 
lenders in the state as a means of avoiding discrimination against insured banks in gen-
eral). 
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does not directly or indirectly discriminate against national banks but 
rather, if it has a “discriminatory effect on national banks” as com-
pared to the effect on state-chartered banks.93  One may look to the 
Equal Credit Opportunity Act (“ECOA”)94 to discern the meaning of 
discriminatory effect within banking law.  The ECOA prohibits dis-
crimination against credit applicants on the basis, inter alia, of age, 
gender, marital status, race, color, religion, or national origin.95  The 
Federal Reserve Board adopted an “effects test” in interpreting the 
ECOA.96  The ECOA may prohibit a particular practice by a creditor 
that has a “disproportionately negative impact” or effect on one of 
the protected classes.97  This may be the case even if the creditor had 
“no intent to discriminate” and the practice itself appears to be “neu-
tral on its face.”98 
As applied to the discriminatory effect preemption prong, a State 
consumer financial law may be deemed to have a discriminatory ef-
fect on national banks as compared to the effect on state banks if, for 
example, the law provides that all businesses located in the state must 
pay a fee to the state to obtain a license to operate.  Under this law, 
state banks would be required to pay the single fee to the state to ob-
tain a license while national banks would be required to pay the fee 
for a state license plus the fee to the Comptroller of the Currency to 
obtain a charter to operate as a national bank.99  Thus, this state law, 
while appearing neutral on its face, would have a disproportionately 
negative impact or effect on national banks as compared to state 
banks. 
The second prong, generally referred to as “Barnett standard 
preemption,”100 has been a source of debate regarding whether the 
prong preserves and codifies the Barnett precedent of conflict 
preemption101 or creates a new preemption standard.  This debate will 
be further discussed in Part II.A.1.  The third prong simply acknowl-
 
 93 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(1)(A)–(B) (2012). 
 94 Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 93-495, 88 Stat. 1521 (1974) (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691(a)–(f) (2012)). 
 95 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1). 
 96 CARNELL ET AL., supra note 13, at 354; see 12 C.F.R. § 202.6 (2013). 
 97 12 C.F.R. § 202.6(a)(2).  An exception exists if the “practice meets a legitimate business 
need” of the creditor that cannot reasonably be accomplished as well in a way that is less 
unequal in its effect.  Id. 
 98 Id. 
 99 See infra note 411 and accompanying text. 
100 Interpretive Letter No. 1132, supra note 92, at 2–4. 
101 See Barnett Bank of Marion Cnty., N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996). 
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edges preemption of State consumer financial laws by other federal 
laws.102 
The Dodd-Frank Act also provides new procedures the Comptrol-
ler must follow under the Barnett standard preemption prong.103  Any 
preemption determination under this prong may be made either “by 
a court, or by regulation or order of the Comptroller of the Currency 
on a case-by-case basis.”104  In each instance, the Comptroller must 
make a determination about the impact the “particular State con-
sumer financial law” has on national banks that are subject to either 
the particular state law or, more broadly, the law of another state with 
“substantively equivalent terms.”105  The Comptroller must consult 
with the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (“BCFP”) in de-
termining that another state’s law is “substantively equivalent” to the 
state law at issue.106  This language was intended to allow the Comp-
troller “to make a single determination” regarding the consumer fi-
nancial laws of multiple states provided each law includes “substan-
tively equivalent terms.”107  Moreover, the Comptroller may not 
preempt a State consumer financial law “unless substantial evidence, 
made on the record of the proceeding, supports the specific finding 
[of preemption] . . . in accordance with the legal standard” of the 
Barnett decision.108  The Comptroller is further required to conduct a 
periodic review every five years after making a preemption determi-
nation with respect to a State consumer financial law.109  The Comp-
troller’s review is subject to notice and public comment.110 
The following Subparts examine the debate regarding the inter-
pretation of the Barnett preemption standard and illustrate how the 
standard will be applied by the Comptroller and the courts. 
1.  Interpretation 
 The Barnett standard preemption prong provides that a State con-
sumer financial law may be preempted if it “prevents or significantly 
interferes” with the national bank’s exercise of its powers “in accord-
 
102 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(1)(C) (2012) (“[T]he State consumer financial law is preempted by a 
provision of Federal law other than title 62 of the Revised Statutes.”). 
103 Dodd-Frank Implementation, supra note 3, at 43,551 n.11. 
104 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(1)(B). 
105 Id. § 25b(b)(3)(A) . 
106 Id. § 25b(b)(3)(B). 
107 Interpretive Letter No. 1132, supra note 92, at 4 & n.17 (citing S. REP. NO. 11-176, at 176 
(2010)). 
108 12 U.S.C. § 25b(c). 
109 Id. § 25b(d)(1). 
110 Id. 
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ance with the legal standard for preemption” in the Barnett deci-
sion.111  Two competing theories have been proffered regarding how 
this prong should be interpreted. 
In a May 12, 2011 letter to Senator Thomas Carper, who along 
with Senator Mark Warner authored the final version of the preemp-
tion provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, the Acting Comptroller of the 
Currency, John Walsh, discussed his interpretation of the Barnett 
standard preemption prong.112  According to Walsh, the use of the 
phrase “in accordance with the legal standard for preemption” in the 
Barnett decision should be interpreted as Congress’s intention that 
the Comptroller use the standard for conflict preemption discussed 
in Barnett.113  Walsh acknowledged that the statute includes the phrase 
“prevent[s] or significantly interfere[s]” from the Barnett case and, 
therefore, the conflict preemption analysis will start with this formu-
lation.114  However, Walsh argued that the statute requires that phrase 
to be analyzed “in accordance with the legal standard for preemp-
tion” in the Barnett decision; thus, the Comptroller’s analysis will in-
corporate the Supreme Court’s entire analysis of conflict preemption 
in Barnett rather than just the single phrase.115 
This analysis appears to be sound.  In examining the plain lan-
guage of the statute, if Congress intended to narrow the preemption 
standard to a “prevents or significantly interferes” standard, then the 
qualifying phrase, “in accordance with the legal standard for preemp-
tion” in the Barnett case,116 would be unnecessary.  Alternatively, if 
Congress intended the “prevents or significantly interferes” language 
to be the new standard for preemption, then the qualifying phrase 
might simply state “in accordance with” the Barnett case.  However, 
the qualifying phrase refers to the “legal standard for preemption” in 
the Barnett decision.117  Thus, Congress appears to have contemplated 
a “legal standard for preemption” broader than the “prevents or sig-
nificantly interferes” language. 
This interpretation is reinforced by the “substantial evidence” re-
quirement of the statute, in which a finding of preemption must be 
 
111 Id. § 25b(b)(1)(B). 
112 Interpretive Letter No. 1132, supra note 92, at 1. 
113 Id. at 2 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(1)(B)) (citing Barnett Bank of Marion Cnty., N.A. v. 
Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 31–32 (1996)). 
114 Id. (quoting 12 U.S.C. §25b(b)(1)(B)) (citing Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 33). 
115 Id. at 2–3 & n.13 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(1)(B)) (citing Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 33–
34). 
116 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(1)(B). 
117 Id. 
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“in accordance with the legal standard” of the Barnett decision.118  
This interpretation is further supported by statutory and judicial 
precedent.119  The language of the Barnett standard preemption provi-
sion in the Dodd-Frank Act is effectively the same language Congress 
used in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 when setting forth 
preemption standards for the sale of insurance by national banks.120  
Moreover, the Sixth Circuit in Ass’n of Banks in Insurance v. Duryee, 
applied the same Barnett “legal standards for preemption” provision 
in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act to preempt certain state licensing laws 
that prohibited national banks from acting as insurance agents in 
small towns with a population of 5,000 or less.121  The Sixth Circuit’s 
analysis makes clear that the “Barnett Bank standard” of the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act refers to the entire analysis of the Supreme Court in 
the Barnett decision.122 
Further, Senator Carper released a statement indicating that the 
Comptroller’s view of the Barnett standard preemption provisions of 
the Dodd-Frank Act is consistent with his intent and the legislative 
language.123  Senator Carper highlighted that the Barnett standard 
preemption provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act “do not create a brand 
new preemption standard, but instead clarify that the traditional 
preemption tests, as laid out by the Supreme Court in the Barnett 
case, continue to apply.”124 
However, the Department of the Treasury took a different view.  
In a June 27, 2011 letter to Acting Comptroller Walsh, General Coun-
sel of the Department of the Treasury George W. Madison argued 
 
118 Id. § 25b(c); see also Interpretive Letter No. 1132, supra note 92, at 3 & n.13 (explaining 
the “substantial evidence” requirement of the statute). 
119 15 U.S.C. § 6701(d)(2)(A) (2012); Ass’n of Banks in Ins. v. Duryee, 270 F.3d 397, 404–05, 
408–10 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing the Barnett Bank decision as the standard for findings of 
preemption); see also Interpretive Letter No. 1132, supra note 92, at 3. 
120 15 U.S.C. § 6701(d)(2)(A) (“In accordance with the legal standards for preemption set 
forth in the [Barnett Bank decision], no State may . . . prevent or significantly interfere 
with the ability of a depository institution . . . to engage . . . in any insurance sales, solicita-
tion, or crossmarketing activity.”); see also Interpretive Letter No. 1132, supra note 92, at 3; 
Letter from Sen. Thomas R. Carper & Sen. Mark R. Warner to Timothy Geithner, Sec’y of 
the Treasury, at 2 (July 8, 2011) (noting the similarities in the language between the 
Dodd-Frank Act and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act). 
121 Ass’n of Banks in Ins., 270 F.3d at 400–01, 404–05, 408–10; see also Interpretive Letter No. 
1132, supra note 92, at 3. 
122 Ass’n of Bank in Ins., 270 F.3d at 404–05, 408  (discussing in detail  the Court’s entire anal-
ysis in the Barnett Bank decision and finding preemption under the “traditional Barnett 
Bank standards”); see also Interpretive Letter No. 1132, supra note 92, at 3. 
123 OCC Letter Sketches Implementation Plan For Preemption Regime Under Dodd-Frank, 
BANKINGDAILY (May 13, 2011), https://newsletters.aba.com/bcnl/20110527.  
124 Id. (quoting May 13, 2011 statement of Sen. Carper). 
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that the “plain language of the statute” provides that a State consum-
er financial law may be preempted if the law “prevents or significantly 
interferes with the exercise by the national bank of its powers.”125  
Therefore, according to the Treasury, Congress intended the “rele-
vant test” to be the more narrow “prevents or significantly interferes” 
standard in the Barnett decision and not the broader interpretation of 
the “entirety of the Barnett opinion” advocated by the Comptroller.126 
In pointed response, Senator Carper and Senator Warner au-
thored a joint correspondence to the Secretary of the Treasury Timo-
thy Geithner reiterating that the “Barnett standard was maintained.”127  
Senators Carper and Warner explained that the “prevents or signifi-
cantly interferes” language “is not a limiting phrase” but rather is 
“stating the touchstone of the Barnett case.”128  Further, the Senators 
emphasized that a finding by the Comptroller to preempt a State 
consumer financial law will be upheld by a court only if the determi-
nation is “in accordance with the legal standard” of the Barnett deci-
sion.129  Therefore, the Dodd-Frank Act “explicitly order[s]” a court to 
review the Comptroller’s preemption finding “based on the legal 
standard of Barnett, not some part of it.”130  As the Senators stated, it 
would be an “absurdity” if Congress were instructing courts to use a 
standard of review that is broader than the standard used by the 
Comptroller of the Currency.131 
In the final rule implementing the preemption provisions of the 
Dodd-Frank Act, the Comptroller further explained that the statute’s 
reference to the “legal standard for preemption” in the Barnett deci-
sion is a reference to “conflict preemption, applied in the context of 
powers granted national banks under Federal law.”132  The Dodd-
Frank Act was not intended to establish, nor does it establish, a new 
“prevents or significantly interferes” standard for preemption.133  The 
“prevents or significantly interferes” language in the statute is simply 
a reference to “part of” the Supreme Court’s “discussion of its reason-
ing” in the Barnett decision and was not intended to be construed as 
 
125 Comment Letter from George W. Madison, Gen. Counsel of the Dep’t of the Treasury, to 
John Walsh, Acting Comptroller of the Currency, at 1–2 (June 27, 2011),  available at http:
//cdn.americanbanker.com/media/pdfs/TreasuryOCC_062811.pdf. 
126 Id. at 2. 
127 Letter from Carper & Warner, supra note 120, at 1 (emphasis added). 
128 Id. 
129 Id. at 2 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 25b(c) (2012)). 
130 Id. (emphasis added). 
131 Id. 
132 Dodd-Frank Implementation, supra note 3, at 43,555. 
133 Id. 
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the “legal standard for preemption” in the decision.134  Thus, the stat-
ute “incorporates the conflict preemption legal standard and the rea-
soning that supports it in the Supreme Court’s Barnett decision.”135 
In sum, Congress’s intent clearly was to maintain and codify the 
Barnett preemption standard.136  This “standard is conflict preemp-
tion, as supported by the reasoning” of the Barnett decision.137  This 
reasoning includes the “prevents or significantly interferes” formula-
tion, “but is not bounded by” it.138  Thus, the standard is broader than 
the “prevents or significantly interferes” language and incorporates 
the entirety of the Barnett preemption analysis.139  The Comptroller 
will, therefore, consider the Supreme Court’s entire analysis of con-
flict preemption in the Barnett decision when determining whether to 
preempt a State consumer financial law.140  This crucial clarification 
in the interpretation of the preemption standard is exceedingly im-
portant in the doctrine of preemption for national banks.  If Con-
gress had not intended to preserve the conflict preemption analysis 
in the Barnett decision, but instead sought to create a new, narrower 
“prevents or significantly interferes” standard, then “it would have 
been rejecting not just Barnett, but also . . . well over a century of judi-
cial precedent upon which the decision was founded.”141 
2.  Application 
 Based on this interpretation of the Barnett standard preemption 
prong, exactly what factors will guide the Comptroller in determining 
whether a State consumer financial law is preempted?  According to 
the Comptroller, the “essence” of the analysis under the Barnett con-
flict preemption standard is an “evaluation of the extent and nature” 
of any “impediment” a state law imposes on the “exercise of a power 
 
134 Id. 
135 Id. 
136 Letter from Carper & Warner, supra note 120, at 1 (“[T]he statute is intended to codify 
the Barnett case.”); Interpretive Letter No. 1132, supra note 92, at 1–2 (citing 156 CONG. 
REC. S5902 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (colloquy between Sen. Carper and Chairman Dodd) 
(“There should be no doubt that the legislation codifies the preemption standard stated 
by the U.S. Supreme Court in [Barnett Bank].”)); see also H.R. REP. NO. 111-517, at 875 
(2010) (Conf. Rep.) (“The conference report [accompanying the Dodd-Frank Act] codi-
fies the standard in . . . Barnett Bank . . . .”). 
137 Dodd-Frank Implementation, supra note 3, at 43,555. 
138 Id. 
139 Letter from Carper & Warner, supra note 120, at 1–2. 
140 Interpretive Letter No. 1132, supra note 92, at 2–3 & n.13. 
141 Dodd-Frank Implementation, supra note 3, at 43,555. 
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granted national banks under Federal law.”142  The “conflict” the 
Comptroller analyzes under the conflict preemption standard is the 
“nature and scope of that impediment.”143  Moreover, the “prevents or 
significantly interferes” formulation is the “touchstone” of the Barnett 
standard for conflict preemption and the related analysis.144  For ex-
ample, in Barnett, the state statute restricting the ability of a national 
bank to sell insurance in small towns imposed an “impediment” on 
the “exercise of a power granted national banks under Federal law.”145  
Based on the Supreme Court’s analysis, the “nature and scope” of 
that impediment significantly interfered with the ability of a national 
bank to exercise its power granted under federal law to sell insurance 
in small towns.146  Thus, the state statute was preempted.147 
Similarly, under the Barnett standard, state laws that require na-
tional banks to make certain disclosures or refrain from using certain 
terms in advertising with respect to taking deposits or making loans 
would “present a significant interference” with the exercise of powers 
granted national banks under federal law.148  For instance, in Franklin 
National Bank of Franklin Square v. New York, the Supreme Court found 
a “clear conflict” between a federal statute that permitted national 
banks to accept savings deposits and a state statute that prohibited 
the use of the word “savings” in the advertising of certain state and 
national banks.149  The Court found “no indication that Congress in-
tended to make this phase of national banking subject to” state law.150  
Thus, the state statute was preempted.151  Franklin National Bank was 
 
142 Dodd-Frank Implementation, supra note 3, at 43,556.  It should be noted that while the 
preemption analysis in the Barnett decision could be applied to any type of state law, the 
scope of the Barnett standard preemption provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act is limited to 
the determination of whether a state consumer financial law is applicable to national 
banks.  Id. at 43,556 n.47. 
143 Id. at 43,556. 
144 Id. at 43,555; Letter from Carper & Warner, supra note 120, at 1; see also Interpretive Let-
ter No. 1132, supra note 92, at 2 (explaining that the preemption provision includes the 
phrase “prevents or significantly interferes” from the Barnett case and, therefore, the con-
flict preemption analysis will start with this formulation). 
145 Barnett Bank of Marion Cnty., N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 32–33 (1996); Dodd-Frank 
Implementation, supra note 3, at 43,556. 
146 Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 32–33; Dodd-Frank Implementation, supra note 3, at 43,556. 
147 Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 28, 37–43. 
148 Dodd-Frank Implementation, supra note 3, at 43,557. 
149 Franklin Nat’l Bank of Franklin Square v. New York, 347 U.S. 373, 374, 378 (1954). 
150 Id. at 378. 
151 Id. at 374; see also Gutierrez v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 704 F.3d 712, 726 (9th Cir. 2012) 
(“The requirement to make particular disclosures falls squarely within the purview of fed-
eral banking regulation and is expressly preempted . . . .”); Rose v. Chase Bank USA, 
N.A., 513 F.3d 1032, 1036–38 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding that the National Bank Act 
preempted a state law requiring certain disclosures on convenience checks issued by na-
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expressly discussed in the Barnett opinion and is one of the many cas-
es upon which the Barnett decision relied.152 
Moreover, state laws that impose an impediment on a fundamen-
tal or core banking business would significantly interfere with the 
ability of a national bank to manage that business.153  For example, 
state laws that would impact the ability of a national bank to “under-
write and mitigate credit risk, manage credit risk exposures, and 
manage loan-related assets” would “meaningfully interfere” with the 
“fundamental” banking business of making loans and managing the 
associated credit risks.154  Similarly, state laws that would impose or al-
ter standards with respect to the depository activities of a national 
bank, such as standards affecting the types and terms of deposit ac-
counts or the availability of funds, would “significantly interfere” with 
the management of a “core” business of national banks.155  State laws 
directed at the depository activities of a national bank are significant 
because such laws affect the “overall risk management and funding 
strategies” of a bank, “including liquidity, interest rate risk exposure, 
funding management, and fraud prevention.”156 
Judicial interpretation of the preemption provisions of the Dodd-
Frank Act provides further enlightenment.  For example, in Baptista 
v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the dis-
missal of a class action suit against JPMorgan Chase for charging a 
check cashing service fee to a non-account holder.157  The plaintiff-
 
tional banks); Am. Bankers Ass’n v. Lockyer, 239 F. Supp.2d 1000, 1014–18 (E.D. Cal. 
2002) (finding preemption of a state law that required mandatory disclosures on credit 
card bills because the “monetary and non-monetary costs” of the disclosures “consti-
tute[d] a significant interference” with the powers granted to national banks under the 
National Bank Act). 
152 Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 33–35 (“In defining the pre-emptive scope of statutes and regula-
tions granting a power to national banks, [prior] cases take the view that normally Con-
gress would not want States to forbid, or to impair significantly, the exercise of a power 
that Congress explicitly granted. . . . Thus, the Court’s discussion in Franklin Nat. Bank 
[sic], the holding of that case, and the other precedent . . . strongly argue for [an inter-
pretation of the federal statute] that does not condition federal permission upon that of 
the State.”). 
153 Dodd-Frank Implementation, supra note 3, at 43,557. 
154 Id. (explaining that, for example, state laws affecting “the protection of collateral value, 
credit enhancements, risk mitigation, loan-to-value standards, loan amortization and re-
payment requirements . . . when a loan may be called due and payable, escrow standards, 
use of credit reports to assess creditworthiness of borrowers, and origination, managing, 
and purchasing and selling extensions of credit” would meaningfully interfere with a na-
tional bank’s fundamental business of making loans and managing the associated risks). 
155 Id. 
156 Id. 
157 Baptista v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 640 F.3d 1194, 1196 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 
132 S. Ct. 253 (2011). 
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appellant alleged the service fee violated a Florida statute that “pro-
hibit[ed] a bank from ‘settl[ing] any check drawn on it otherwise 
than at par.’”158  In considering the question of what type of preemp-
tion would be applicable (i.e., express preemption, field preemption, 
or conflict preemption), the Eleventh Circuit underscored that the 
Dodd-Frank Act amended the preemption section of the National 
Bank Act “to address this very issue.”159  Upon review of the Barnett 
preemption standard in the statute, as well as the Barnett case itself, 
the court found that “under the Dodd-Frank Act, the proper preemp-
tion test asks whether there is a significant conflict between the state 
and federal statutes—that is, the test for conflict preemption.”160  Ap-
plying this test, the court found a “clear conflict” to exist.161  The state 
statute which prohibited the charging of fees to non-account holders 
was in “substantial conflict with federal authorization,” which permit-
ted such fees to be charged.162  Thus, the state statute was preempt-
ed.163 
A number of points may be drawn from the Baptista case.  In its 
analysis, the Eleventh Circuit observed that the Supreme Court in 
Barnett found that the “controlling question” was whether the state 
law “forbid[s], or . . . impair[s] significantly, the exercise of a power 
that Congress explicitly granted.”164  The Eleventh Circuit concluded 
that the “proper preemption test” under the Dodd-Frank Act is “the 
test for conflict preemption.”165  This analysis was directly in line with 
that of the Comptroller and with the intent of Congress.  The “pre-
vents or significantly interferes” formulation or even the “forbid[s], 
or . . . impair[s] significantly” formulation is the “touchstone” of the 
preemption analysis.166  However, the analysis does not end with ei-
ther of these formulations.  As the Eleventh Circuit and the Comp-
 
158 Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 655.85 (2011)). 
159 Id. at 1197. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. at 1198. 
162 Id. 
163 Id.  
164 Id. at 1197 (quoting Barnett Bank of Marion Cnty., N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 33 
(1996)). 
165 Id. 
166 See Dodd-Frank Implementation, supra note 3, at 43,555 (noting that the “prevents or sig-
nificantly interferes” formulation is the “touchstone” of the Barnett standard for conflict 
preemption and the related analysis); Letter from Carper and Warner, supra note 120, at 
1 (explaining that the “prevents or significantly interferes” language “is not a limiting 
phrase” but rather “stat[es] the touchstone of the Barnett case”); see also Interpretive Let-
ter No. 1132, supra note 92, at 2 (explaining that the provision includes the phrase “pre-
vents or significantly interferes” from the Barnett case and, therefore, the conflict preemp-
tion analysis will start with this formulation). 
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troller pointed out, the preemption standard under the Dodd-Frank 
Act is the broader test of “conflict preemption” based on the entirety 
of the analysis in the Supreme Court’s Barnett decision.167 
Further, as discussed previously in Part I.A, the principles of con-
flict preemption continue to apply even when the state law is particu-
larly important to the state.168  The state law in Baptista “[did] not di-
rectly or indirectly discriminate against national banks 
and . . . directly and specifically regulate[d] the manner, content, or 
terms and conditions of [a] financial transaction . . . with respect to a 
consumer.”169  Thus, the state law at issue in Baptista was a State con-
sumer financial law under the meaning of the Dodd-Frank Act.170  
While State consumer financial laws are, without question, of particu-
lar importance to the state, it is evident that even after the financial 
crisis, during which many consumers suffered financial harm,171 
courts will continue to honor the principles of conflict preemption as 
indicated by the decision in Baptista to preempt a State consumer fi-
nancial law.172 
Moreover, not only was the state statute in Baptista a State con-
sumer financial law, but, in particular, it was a law that protected in-
dividuals who did not have a bank account in which to deposit a 
check and, therefore, would need to cash the check with the bank 
upon which the check was drawn.173  Such individuals are most likely 
of limited financial means and lack the wherewithal to open and 
maintain the minimum balances necessary for a modern bank ac-
count.174  These are exactly the type of individuals the Dodd-Frank Act 
 
167 Baptista, 640 F.3d at 1197; Dodd-Frank Implementation, supra note 3, at 43,555 (“Th[e] 
standard is conflict preemption, as supported by the reasoning of the [Barnett] deci-
sion.”). 
168 See supra notes 45–46 and accompanying text. 
169 12 U.S.C. § 25b(a)(2) (2012); Baptista 640 F.3d at 1196 (11th Cir. 2011). 
170 12 U.S.C. § 25b(a)(2); Baptista, 640 F.3d at 1196–97. 
171 156 CONG. REC. S5888 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (statement of Sen. Johnson) (explaining 
that, as a result of the financial crisis, “Americans . . . were losing their homes, jobs, and 
long-term savings”). 
172 See Baptista, 640 F.3d at 1196–98. 
173 Baptista did not have a checking account with Chase.  It may be presumed that Baptista 
also did not have a checking account with any other bank and, therefore, needed to cash 
the check with the bank upon which it was drawn.  See id. at 1196.  See also Wells Fargo 
Bank of Tex., N.A. v. James, 321 F.3d 488, 490 (5th Cir. 2003) (describing a similar statute 
that was enacted in Texas “as a consumer protection measure . . . to ensure that Texas 
employees, and in particular the working poor, receive payment for the face value of 
their paycheck.”). 
174 See James, 321 F.3d at 490 (“[I]ndividuals who do not have a checking account and who 
seek to cash checks at the institution which issued the [check] are predominantly low-
income individuals . . . .”); 156 CONG. REC. S5871 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (statement of 
Sen. Akaka) (“Regular checking accounts may be too expensive for some consumers un-
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ostensibly intended to protect.175  One of the primary purposes of the 
statute was “to protect consumers from abusive financial services 
practices.”176  Yet, the Dodd-Frank Act directs courts to precisely the 
conflict preemption analysis undertaken in Baptista, which resulted in 
the preemption of a State consumer financial law that otherwise 
would have prevented a bank from charging a consumer a $6.00 fee 
to cash a $262.48 check.177  While some may find this to be an unten-
able result, it is the correct result for two reasons. 
First, preemption is the correct result under the Baptista court’s 
preemption analysis.178  Specifically, the National Bank Act permits 
banks to “exercise . . . all such incidental powers as shall be necessary 
to carry on the business of banking[] by discounting and negotiating 
promissory notes, drafts, bills of exchange, and other evidences of 
debt.”179  In addition, the Comptroller promulgated a regulation pur-
suant to the National Bank Act that permits a national bank to 
“charge its customers non-interest charges and fees, including deposit 
account service charges.”180  The Comptroller’s interpretation of the 
term “customer” included “any person who presents a check for pay-
ment.”181  The Eleventh Circuit found that the Comptroller was au-
thorized to “regulate banking and banking-related activities.”182  Fur-
ther, the Comptroller’s interpretation of the term “customer” to be 
“any person presenting a check for payment” was “not unreasona-
ble.”183  The court noted that the significant objective of the Comp-
troller’s regulation was to permit national banks not only to charge 
such fees but also to provide national banks with the “option of how 
to charge” the fees.184  The Eleventh Circuit found that the state law 
 
able to maintain minimum balances or afford monthly fees.”).  For example, the Chase 
Total Checking account requires the account holder to pay a “$12 [m]onthly [s]ervice 
[f]ee” or, to avoid the monthly fee, the account holder must (i) make “monthly direct 
deposits totaling $500 or more,” (ii) maintain a “$1,500 minimum daily balance,” or (iii) 
maintain an “average daily balance of $5,000 or more” combined with another account. 
Chase Total Checking, CHASE, https://www.chase.com/checking/total-checking (last vis-
ited Mar. 29, 2013).  
175 See generally 156 CONG. REC. S5870 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (explaining that one of the 
purposes of the Dodd-Frank Act is “to protect consumers”). 
176 Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, pmbl., 124 Stat. 1376. 
177 Baptista, 640 F.3d at 1196–98. 
178 Id. 
179 Id. at 1196 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 24). 
180 Id. at 1196–97 (quoting 12 C.F.R. § 7.4002(a) (2001)). 
181 Id. at 1197 (quoting James, 321 F.3d at 490 & n.2). 
182 Id. at 1198. 
183 Id. 
184 Id. at 1198 n.2 (“[T]he establishment of non-interest charges and fees, their amounts, 
and the method of calculating them are business decisions to be made by each bank, in 
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“reduce[d] the bank’s fee options by [fifty percent].”185  Thus, the 
state statute prohibiting the charging of a check cashing service fee to 
non-account holders was in “substantial conflict” with the Comptrol-
ler’s regulation pursuant to the National Bank Act that allowed banks 
to charge these fees.186  Therefore, the court correctly held that the 
state statute was preempted.187 
Second, the check cashing fee is not an abusive practice.  Rather, 
charging a check cashing fee to non-account holders is a means of 
mitigating the risk of paying on a check with a fraudulent endorse-
ment.  The basic rule is that the depository bank is liable for a check 
paid with a forged endorsement.188  When the depository bank pre-
sents a check for payment to the drawee or payor bank, the deposito-
ry bank warrants to the drawee bank that the check does not contain 
a fraudulent endorsement.189  If the drawee bank pays on a check that 
does contain a fraudulent endorsement, then the drawee bank has 
recourse against the depository bank.190  However, if the drawee bank 
cashes the check rather than paying the check through the normal 
clearance process, then the drawee bank bears the risk of a fraudu-
lent endorsement. 191  For example, under the facts of the Baptista 
case, Chase cashed the check for a non-account holder.192  Therefore, 
the bank did not know the payee on the check and could not verify 
the signature endorsing the check.  As the drawee bank cashing a 
check for a non-account holder, Chase assumed the considerable risk 
that the endorsement on the check may have been forged.  Thus, the 
check cashing fee is an appropriate means of mitigating the bank’s 
substantial risk of paying on a check with a forged endorsement.193  As 
discussed in this Subpart, state laws affecting the depository activities 
 
its discretion, according to sound banking judgment and safe and sound banking princi-
ples.” (quoting 12 C.F.R. § 7.4002 (2001))); accord Gutierrez v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. 
704 F.3d 712, 723–25 (9th Cir. 2012). 
185 Baptista, 640 F.3d at 1198. 
186 Id. at 1196–98. 
187 Id. at 1198. 
188 U.C.C. §4-208(b) (2002); Craig W. Smith, Drawee Bank Not Required to Examine Checks for 
Forged Endorsements, BANKERSONLINE.COM (Mar. 26, 2001), http://www.bankersonline.
com/compliance/v_gurus_cmp032601.html. 
189 U.C.C. §4-208(a) (2002); Smith, supra note 188. 
190 U.C.C. §4-208(b); Smith, supra note 188. 
191 CARNELL ET AL., supra note 13, at 51. 
192 Baptista, 640 F.3d at 1196. 
193 But cf. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §1075, 124 Stat. 1376, 2068–74 (2010) (codi-
fied at 15 U.S.C. §1693o-2) (addressing interchange transaction fees regarding electronic 
debit card transactions).  Notably, the Dodd-Frank Act does not address either transac-
tion fees or fraud prevention fees with respect to the cashing of checks for non-account 
holders. 
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of a national bank, such as standards relating to the terms of deposit 
accounts, would “significantly interfere” with the management of a 
“core” business of national banks because such laws affect the “risk 
management” of a bank, including the prevention of fraud.194 
While the Dodd-Frank Act provided the reform of new procedures 
to be followed by the Comptroller in preemption determinations,195 
the Barnett standard of conflict preemption was maintained for State 
consumer financial laws.196  Thus, the doctrine of preemption has 
been effectively unchanged in this area.197  The Comptroller and the 
courts have the same latitude as before to find State consumer finan-
cial laws in conflict with federal laws and therefore preempted.  The 
law of preemption was also unchanged with regard to state laws that 
do not qualify as State consumer financial laws.198  In contrast, the 
statute provided for discriminatory effect preemption as a new stand-
ard for finding preemption of a State consumer financial law.199  
Thus, the standard for preemption of state law has been broadened 
in this respect. 
The following Subpart provides an analysis of the standard of re-
view that courts should apply to the Comptroller’s preemption deci-
sions.  The Dodd-Frank Act has instituted a significant reform in this 
area. 
B.  Standard of Review 
 Courts have developed two levels of deference when reviewing ac-
tions by an administrative agency.200  The “higher level of deference is 
known as ‘Chevron deference’” and is based on the principles articu-
lated by the Supreme Court in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc.201  Courts will provide Chevron deference “when it 
appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to 
make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpreta-
 
194 Dodd-Frank Implementation, supra note 3, at 43,557; see also supra notes 155–56 and ac-
companying text. 
195 See supra notes 103–10 and accompanying text. 
196 See supra notes 136–37 and accompanying text.  With regard to national banks, the statute 
addresses only State consumer financial laws.  See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
197 See U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Schipper, 812 F. Supp. 2d 963 n.1 (S.D. Iowa 2011) (“[T]he 
Dodd-Frank Act adopts the same standard applied by the Watters court . . . . Thus, the 
Dodd-Frank Act did not materially alter the standard for preemption the Court must ap-
ply in this case.”). 
198 See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
199 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(1)(A) (2012).  See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
200 Bate v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 454 B.R. 869, 877 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2011). 
201 Id. (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)). 
1068 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 16:4 
 
tion . . . was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.”202  An 
agency may show that it is empowered to act with the force of law “in 
a variety of ways, as by an agency’s power to engage in adjudication or 
notice-and-comment rulemaking, or by some other indication of a 
comparable congressional intent.”203 
Prior to the Dodd-Frank Act, the standard of review applied to a 
decision by the Comptroller of the Currency was based on the Chev-
ron framework.204  Under this framework, a court first considers 
whether the federal statute reveals an “unambiguously expressed in-
tent of Congress’ that addresses ‘the precise question at issue.’”205  If 
Congress’s intent is found, “that is the end of the matter.”206  A court 
will enforce that intent.207  Thus, if “Congress has spoken unambigu-
ously as to the precise question at hand, the court must enforce Con-
gress’ intent” even if the agency empowered to administer the statute 
has “adopted an alternate interpretation.”208 
However, if Congress has not “directly spoken to the precise ques-
tion at issue,” Chevron provided that a court will defer to an adminis-
trative agency’s interpretation where it “is based on a permissible 
construction of the statute” the agency administers.209  In Chevron, the 
Supreme Court further explained that “a court may not substitute its 
own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpreta-
tion made by the administrator of an agency.”210  Moreover, if the 
agency’s interpretation “represents a reasonable accommodation of 
conflicting policies that were committed to the agency’s care by the 
statute, [the courts] should not disturb it unless it appears from the 
statute or its legislative history that the accommodation is not one 
that Congress would have sanctioned.”211  Courts have interpreted 
Chevron to “require deference to any reasonable interpretation of the 
statute offered by the agency.”212  As stated by the Supreme Court in 
 
202 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001). 
203 Id. at 227; David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. REV. 135, 146 (2010). 
204 Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, 557 U.S. 519, 525 (2009) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 
844). 
205 Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc. v. Ludwig, 997 F.2d 958, 959 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (citations 
omitted) (quoting Chevron 467 U.S. at 843). 
206 NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 257 (1995) 
(quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842). 
207 Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc. 997 F.2d at 959 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842). 
208 Wells Fargo Bank of Tex., N.A. v. James, 321 F.3d 488, 492 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Chevron, 
467 U.S. at 837). 
209 Chevron, 467 U.S. at  842–43. 
210 Id. at 844. 
211 Id. at 845 (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 383 (1961)). 
212 Zaring, supra note 203, at 144. 
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NationsBank of North Carolina, N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance 
Co., if the agency’s interpretation “fills a gap or defines a term in a 
way that is reasonable” the courts will give the agency’s interpretation 
“controlling weight.”213  Thus, where Congress’s intent is not found, 
courts will defer to an administrative “agency’s reasonable interpreta-
tion of a statute it is charged with administering.”214  Courts defer to 
agency interpretations under Chevron based on a “presumption” that 
when Congress leaves “ambiguity in a statute meant for implementa-
tion by an agency,” Congress intended that the agency would resolve 
the ambiguity and should “possess whatever degree of discretion the 
ambiguity allows.”215 
The Comptroller of the Currency is the agency charged with ad-
ministering the National Bank Act.216  Congress granted the Comp-
troller the general authority to “prescribe rules and regulations” un-
der the National Bank Act217 as well as the specific authority to make 
preemption determinations under the statute.218  Thus, if the review-
 
213 NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 257 (1995) 
(quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844). 
214 See Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, 557 U.S. 519, 525 (2009) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 
844) (articulating the legal test to determine whether to grant deference to a government 
agency’s interpretation of a statute which it administers); see also Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), 
N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 739 (1996) (“It is our practice to defer to the reasonable judgments of 
agencies with regard to the meaning of ambiguous terms in statutes that they are charged 
with administering.”); Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc. v. Ludwig, 997 F.2d 958, 960 (D.C. 
Cir. 1993) (explaining that if congressional intent is not found, “we must defer to the 
agency’s interpretation so long as it is permissible”). 
215 Smiley, 517 U.S. at 740–41 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44). 
216 See Cuomo, 557 U.S. at 525 (stating the fact that the Comptroller of the Currency adminis-
ters the National Bank Act); see also 12 U.S.C. § 93a (2012) (“[T]he Comptroller of the 
Currency is authorized to prescribe rules and regulations to carry out the responsibilities 
of the office . . . .”); Smiley, 517 U.S. at 739 (“The Comptroller . . . is charged with the en-
forcement of banking laws to an extent that warrants the invocation of [the rule of defer-
ence] with respect to his deliberative conclusions as to the meaning of these laws.” (quot-
ing NationsBank of N.C., 513 U.S. at 256–57)); Baptista v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 640 
F.3d 1194, 1196, 1198 (11th Cir. 2011) (“Congress clearly intended that the [Comptrol-
ler] be empowered to regulate banking and banking-related activities.”); Wells Fargo 
Bank of Tex., N.A. v. James, 321 F.3d 488, 490 (5th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he Comptroller of the 
Currency . . . is the agency empowered by the [National Bank Act] to supervise and regu-
late federally chartered banks in accordance with the broad substantive provisions of the 
[statute].”). 
217 12 U.S.C. § 93a (2012) . 
218 See id. § 43(a) (explaining that “before issuing any opinion letter or interpretive 
rule . . . that concludes that Federal law preempts the application to a national bank of 
any State law regarding community reinvestment, consumer protection, fair lending, or 
the establishment of intrastate branches,” the Comptroller must adhere to certain proce-
dural requirements); see also Rose v. Chase Manhattan Bank USA, N.A. 396 F. Supp. 2d 
1116, 1122 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (“Pursuant to 11 [sic] U.S.C. § 43 . . . , the OCC possesses the 
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ing court finds ambiguity in the meaning of the National Bank Act, 
then the Comptroller “can give authoritative meaning to the statute 
within the bounds of that uncertainty.”219  However, the existence of 
ambiguity in the statute “does not expand Chevron deference to cover 
virtually any interpretation of the National Bank Act.”220  While the 
Comptroller’s regulation does not need to be “the best interpretation 
of the statute,” the regulation must be a “reasonable” interpretation 
of the statute.221 
Courts also will review the agency’s interpretation of its own regu-
lation promulgated pursuant to a statute to determine whether that 
interpretation is reasonable.222  The standard used when an agency 
interprets a regulation it has promulgated is provided by Auer v. Rob-
bins.223  A court’s first step in determining whether to provide Auer 
deference is to consider whether the language of the agency’s regula-
tion is ambiguous.224  If a reviewing court determines that the agen-
cy’s regulation is “ambiguous as to the precise issue” in question, then 
the “agency’s interpretation of its own regulation is controlling unless 
 
authority to preempt certain state laws.” (citing Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Boutris, 419 
F.3d 949, 962–63 (9th Cir. 2005))). 
219 See Cuomo, 557 U.S. at 535 (noting that the Comptroller’s regulation interpreting the 
term “visitorial powers” in the National Bank Act to include “‘conducting examinations 
[and] inspecting or requiring the production of books or records’” of a national bank is a 
reasonable interpretation of the National Bank Act (quoting 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000 (2009))); 
see also 12 U.S.C. § 484(a) (“No national bank shall be subject to any visitorial powers ex-
cept as authorized by Federal law, vested in the courts of justice . . . .”).  
220 Cuomo, 557 U.S. at 519 (holding that the Comptroller’s regulation preempting a state’s 
enforcement of its own laws in state court is not a reasonable interpretation of the term 
“visitorial powers” in the National Bank Act (citing 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000)). 
221 See Smiley, 517 U.S. at 737–40, 744–45, 747 (holding that the Comptroller’s regulation 
interpreting the term “interest” in the National Bank Act to include late payment fees on 
credit cards is a reasonable interpretation of the statute); see also 12 U.S.C. § 85 (noting 
that interest may be charged on any “evidence of debt”); 12 C.F.R. § 7.4001(a) (2011) 
(noting that interest “includes any payment compensating a creditor or prospective credi-
tor for an extension of credit” as well as fees associated with the extension of credit, such 
as late fees). 
222 See Baptista v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. 640 F.3d 1194, 1198 (11th Cir. 2011) (finding 
preemption where state law conflicts with the Comptroller’s regulation promulgated pur-
suant to the National Bank Act and the agency’s interpretation of its regulation is “not 
unreasonable”); see also 12 C.F.R. § 7.4002 (providing for preemption when in accordance 
with United States Constitutional principles). 
223 See Baptista, 640 F.3d at 1197–98 (noting that the standard used to determine whether to 
defer to an agency’s interpretation of a regulation it has promulgated is Auer deference); 
see also Wells Fargo Bank of Tex., N.A. v. James, 321 F.3d 488, 494 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing 
Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 458 (1997) (confirming that Auer deference is the legal 
standard used when an agency interprets a regulation it has promulgated). 
224 James, 321 F.3d at 494 (citing Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000)) (ex-
plaining the Auer deference legal test). 
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it is clearly erroneous.”225  Thus, under Auer, “an agency’s interpreta-
tion of its own regulation is also entitled to Chevron deference.”226 
In addition, courts will consider whether the agency’s current in-
terpretation is a deviation from its prior policy.227  A deviation from 
prior policy may be found when the agency’s new interpretation con-
stitutes a “change of official agency position.”228  However, prior 
agency letters that contradict a new regulation would likely be “too 
informal” to be considered a “binding agency policy.”229  Nevertheless, 
Chevron deference has sometimes been afforded based on a new 
agency letter in cases where a formal notice and comment rulemak-
ing was not required.230  Moreover, while a “[s]udden and unex-
plained change” or a change that does not consider “legitimate reli-
ance on prior interpretation” may be found to be “arbitrary, 
capricious[, or] an abuse of discretion,” change in and of itself is “not 
 
225 See id. (citing Auer, 519 U.S. at 461) (holding that the Comptroller’s interpretation of the 
term “customer” in its regulation to mean “any person who presents a check for payment” 
is not clearly erroneous and, therefore, is controlling; determining that a state statute 
which prohibited banks from paying a check drawn on it other than at par regardless of 
whether the payee is an account holder at the bank is in “irreconcilable conflict” with the 
Comptroller’s regulation permitting national banks to charge fees when cashing checks 
for non-account holders, and thus, is preempted); see also 12 C.F.R. § 7.4002(a) (provid-
ing that national banks may charge “non-interest charges and fees, including deposit ac-
count service charges”); cf. Cuomo, 557 U.S. at 531–32 (finding the “Comptroller’s interpre-
tation of its regulation . . . cannot be reconciled with” the regulation or the statute).  
226 Bate v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. 454 B.R. 869, 877 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2011) (citing Auer, 519 
U.S. at 461) (explaining that where an agency’s regulations were not created by the agen-
cy, but rather represent a “codification” of Supreme Court precedent, the agency’s inter-
pretation of its regulations “should not be given Chevron deference” and thus applying 
Skidmore-level deference to the Comptroller’s interpretation). The Bate court’s decision to 
use a Skidmore standard of review was in part based on the Supreme Court case of Wyeth v. 
Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009).  Bate 454 B.R. at 878 & n.57.  Wyeth concerned a declara-
tion of preemption by the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) with regard to state 
law.  Wyeth 129 S. Ct. at 1193.  The Supreme Court found that Congress had not granted 
the FDA authority to preempt state law.   Id. at 1201–02.  Therefore, the Court applied 
Skidmore-level deference.  Id. at 1201.  In contrast, as the Bate court acknowledged, “the 
OCC has been given authority to make determinations on the preemption of consumer 
protection laws.”  Bate, 454 B.R. at 878. 
227 Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A. 517 U.S. 735, 742–43 (1996) (finding that the Comptrol-
ler’s regulation did not constitute a change in the official policy of the agency); Indep. 
Ins. Agents of Am., Inc. v. Ludwig, 997 F.2d 958, 962 (D.C. Cir 1993) (holding that the 
Comptroller’s interpretation of the National Bank Act to permit national banks located 
in a town of 5,000 or less to sell insurance outside that town is a reasonable interpretation 
of the statute and does not diverge from prior policy). 
228 Smiley, 517 U.S. at 742–43 .  
229 Id. at 743. 
230 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 231 & n.13 (2001) (citing NationsBank of 
N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 256–57, 263 (1995) (finding 
Chevron deference even in the absence of administrative formalities)). 
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invalidating.”231  As stated by the Supreme Court in Smiley v. Citibank 
(South Dakota), N.A., “the whole point of Chevron” is that the agency 
responsible for interpreting the ambiguities of a statute should have 
the discretion to interpret that statute, including the discretion to 
change its interpretation.232 
The second and lower level of deference is “Skidmore deference” 
based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.233  
Skidmore deference generally applies when an agency is not acting 
with the force of law.234  In contrast to the higher level Chevron defer-
ence,235 which is based on a “reasonableness” standard,236 the level of 
deference provided to an agency under the Skidmore standard is based 
on “the thoroughness evident in [the agency’s] consideration, the va-
lidity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pro-
nouncements, and all those factors which give it power to per-
suade.”237  There is a significant distinction between the two levels of 
deference.  Under Chevron, a court is deciding whether the agency’s 
interpretation is “within the bounds of reasonableness” notwithstand-
ing the possibility that the court itself may have arrived at a different 
interpretation.238  Under Skidmore, the court itself is deciding how to 
best interpret the law with the agency’s interpretation provided as a 
reference.239  Under Chevron deference, the courts “must defer” to an 
agency’s reasonable interpretation of a statute; however, under Skid-
more deference, the courts “may defer” depending upon the persua-
siveness of the agency’s interpretation.240  Thus, in contrast to Chevron 
 
231 Smiley, 517 U.S. at 742 (“[T]he mere fact that an agency interpretation contradicts a prior 
agency position is not fatal.”). 
232 Id.; see also NationsBank of N.C., 513 U.S. at 263 (“[A]ny change in the Comptroller’s posi-
tion might reduce, but would not eliminate, the deference we owe his reasoned determi-
nations.”). 
233 Bate v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. 454 B.R. 869, 877 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2011). 
234 Mead, 533 U.S. at 237 (“Chevron left Skidmore intact and applicable where statutory circum-
stances indicate no intent to delegate general authority to make rules with force of law, or 
where such authority was not invoked . . . .”); Zaring, supra note 203, at 145–46 (explain-
ing the difference between Chevron deference and Skidmore deference). 
235 Bate, 454 B.R. at 877 (explaining the levels of deference accorded agency interpretations 
of which Chevron deference is the most deferential). 
236 See supra notes 210–14 and accompanying text. 
237 Bate, 454 B.R. at 877 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)) (ex-
plaining the factors involved in determining the level of deference to grant under the 
Skidmore standard). 
238 William Funk, Judicial Deference and Regulatory Preemption by Federal Agencies, 84 TUL. L. REV. 
1233, 1241 (2010) . 
239 Id. 
240 Zaring, supra note 203, at 146. 
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deference, agency interpretations reviewed under Skidmore deference 
are “not controlling upon the courts.”241 
In the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress adopted Skidmore deference as 
the new standard of review of a decision by the Comptroller to 
preempt a state law.242  Under the statute, a court reviewing a preemp-
tion determination by the Comptroller must “assess the validity of 
such determinations” based upon (i) the thoroughness of the Comp-
troller’s consideration, (ii) the validity of the Comptroller’s reason-
ing, (iii) the consistency with the Comptroller’s other valid determi-
nations, and (iv) any other persuasive and relevant factors.243  Thus, 
courts must now use the four part Skidmore test in reviewing a 
preemption decision by the Comptroller.244  Moreover, the new 
standard of review is applicable to the Comptroller’s preemption de-
terminations regarding any state laws, not only State consumer finan-
cial laws.245 
Congress apparently has decided to accord the Comptroller the 
lower level of deference under Skidmore,246 even though Congress has 
delegated to the Comptroller the general authority “to make rules 
carrying the force of law” in its role as the agency charged with ad-
ministering the National Bank Act.247  An agency determination made 
under such congressional delegation of authority is normally provid-
ed with Chevron-level deference.248  In the context of preemption, this 
agency deference was bolstered by the Supreme Court’s determina-
tion that a “pre-emptive regulation’s force does not depend on ex-
press congressional authorization” to preempt state law.249  Thus, an 
agency may rely on its general rulemaking authority and does not 
need express congressional authority to preempt state law.250  Howev-
 
241 Id. (quoting Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140). 
242 See 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(5) (2012) (setting forth Skidmore deference as the standard of re-
view to be used when courts review preemption determinations by the Comptroller); see 
also Bate, 454 B.R. at 877 n.46 (“Skidmore level deference has been incorporated in the 
new Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act . . . .”). 
243 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(5)(A). 
244 Id.; Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140 (establishing a four-part test for deference).  
245 See 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(5)(A)  (“A court reviewing any determinations made by the Comp-
troller regarding preemption of a State law by title 62 of the Revised Statutes or section 
371 of this title shall assess the validity of such determinations . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
246 Id. 
247 United States v. Mead Corp. 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001); see also supra notes 216–17 and 
accompanying text. 
248 See supra notes 202–03 and accompanying text. 
249 Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 154 (1982). 
250 Cf. Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 727, 768 
(2008) (finding the Supreme Court’s statement to indicate only an implied proposition 
of general agency authority to preempt state law). 
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er, the Comptroller’s authority to make preemption determinations 
does not rest solely on Supreme Court precedent.  Congress has del-
egated to the Comptroller the specific authority to make preemption 
determinations under the National Bank Act.251  As a result, the 
Comptroller has been accorded Chevron-level deference in its deter-
minations pursuant to the National Bank Act, including its determi-
nations of preemption.252  Thus, the Dodd-Frank Act marks a sea 
change in the level of deference provided to the Comptroller’s deci-
sions to preempt a state law.253 
However, the effect of this shift in the standard of review remains 
to be seen.  As a practical matter, it is unlikely a court will refuse to 
provide deference to an agency interpretation that is reasonable even 
if the lower level Skidmore deference is applied.254  Moreover, scholars 
have argued that “the ‘reasonable agency’ standard is, increasingly 
clearly the standard that courts actually apply to all exercises of judi-
cial review of administrative action, no matter what standard they 
purport to use.”255  Taken a step further, in the Baptista case, despite 
the court expressly acknowledging the preemption standard set forth 
in the Dodd-Frank Act, the Eleventh Circuit did not even allude to 
the statute’s new Skidmore standard of review.256  Instead, the Eleventh 
Circuit simply noted that Auer level deference should be applied 
when an agency is interpreting its own regulations.257  Thus, the court 
applied the Chevron reasonableness standard to the Comptroller’s in-
terpretation of its regulation promulgated pursuant to the National 
Bank Act.258 
The Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning regarding the standard of review 
in the Baptista case259 poses some questions.  Why did the court follow 
the Dodd-Frank Act with respect to the standard for preemption, yet 
fail to follow the statute’s directive regarding the standard of re-
view?260  The simple answer may be that the preemption provisions of 
 
251 See 12 U.S.C. § 43 (2012) (statute authorizing the Comptroller to preempt state law in 
accordance with the National Bank Act). 
252 See supra notes 204, 219 and accompanying text. 
253 See 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(5)(A) (referring to the section of the statute that accords Skidmore 
deference as the standard of review for preemption). 
254 Zaring, supra note 203, at 159. 
255 Id. at 137. 
256 Baptista v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. 640 F.3d 1194, 1197–98 (11th Cir. 2011); see supra 
note 242 and accompanying text. 
257 Baptista, 640 F.3d at 1197–98. 
258 Id. at 1198 (adopting the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning to find preemption by the federal regu-
lation at issue, in accordance with the agency’s interpretation of its own regulation). 
259 See generally id. at 1197–98. 
260 See 12 U.S.C. §§ 25b(b)(1)(B), (5)(A) (2012); Baptista, 640 F.3d at 1197–98. 
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the Dodd-Frank Act, while enacted, were a little over two months 
short of the effective date.261  On the other hand, given the court’s 
lack of acknowledgement of the statute’s new standard of review, is 
the Eleventh Circuit’s application of Auer deference and determina-
tion of Chevron reasonableness in the Baptista case an indication that 
courts will continue to give deference to preemption interpretations 
by the Comptroller that are reasonable even under the statute’s new 
Skidmore standard?262  While these questions may not be answered 
imminently and certainly not unequivocally, it is possible that some 
courts reviewing a determination by the Comptroller to preempt a 
state law may continue to use the reasonableness standard of Chev-
ron.263 
Nevertheless, an examination of the new four-prong standard of 
review is warranted.  The first prong directs a reviewing court to as-
sess the thoroughness of the Comptroller’s consideration in deciding 
to preempt a state law.264  Courts have interpreted this prong to re-
quire “in-depth consideration of the disputed issue.”265  Arguably, this 
prong presents a more rigorous standard of review of the Comptrol-
ler’s preemption determinations than required under Chevron.266  
However, at least with respect to State consumer financial laws, the 
new procedures the Comptroller must follow in making a preemp-
tion determination should meet the “thoroughness” requirement.267  
For example, any determination by the Comptroller under the Bar-
nett standard preemption provision may be made either “by regula-
tion or order . . . on a case-by-case basis.”268  In each case, the Comp-
troller must make a determination about the effect of the “particular 
State consumer financial law” on national banks subject to that state 
law or the law of another state with “substantively equivalent terms.”269  
 
261 The preemption provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act became effective on the designated 
transfer date, which the Act defined as one year after the date of enactment.  The date of 
enactment was July 21, 2010; thus, the transfer date was July 21, 2011.  See Dodd-Frank 
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, pmbl., 124 Stat. 1376.; see also 12 U.S.C. § 25b note (2010) (“En-
actment and amendment of section by Pub. L. 111-203 effective on the designated trans-
fer date . . . .”).  The Eleventh Circuit decided the Baptista case on May 11, 2011.  Baptista, 
640 F.3d at 1194. 
262 See Baptista, 640 F.3d at 1197–98; 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(5)(A). 
263 See, e.g., Baptista, 640 F.3d at 1197–98; see also Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–45 (1984).  
264 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(5)(A). 
265 Doe v. Leavitt, 552 F.3d 75, 81 (1st Cir. 2009). 
266 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–45. 
267 See 12 U.S.C. § 25(b)(5)(A); Dodd-Frank Implementation, supra note 3, at 43,551 n.11. 
268 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(1)(B). 
269 Id. § 25b(b)(3)(A). 
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The Comptroller must consult with the BCFP in determining that the 
law of another state is “substantively equivalent” to the state law at is-
sue.270  Moreover, the Comptroller may not preempt a State consumer 
financial law “unless substantial evidence, made on the record of the 
proceeding, supports the specific finding [of preemption] in accord-
ance with the legal standard” of the Barnett decision.271  Thus, these 
new requirements appear to build in a level of thoroughness in the 
Comptroller’s determinations which should be sufficient to withstand 
judicial review of this prong. 
The second prong requires a court to assess the validity of the 
Comptroller’s reasoning in making a preemption determination.272  
In reviewing the validity of an agency’s reasoning, a court will consid-
er “whether an agency pronouncement is well-reasoned, substantiat-
ed, and logical.”273  Thus, the question is whether this prong intro-
duces a more rigorous standard than the Chevron reasonableness test, 
or whether this prong is simply a codification of Chevron.274  Arguably, 
for a decision to be reasonable, that decision must be well-reasoned, 
logical, and substantiated or supported.275  For example, in Colaio v. 
 
270 Id. § 25b(b)(3)(B). 
271 Id. § 25b(c). 
272 Id. § 25b(b)(5)(A). 
273 De La Mota v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 412 F.3d 71, 80–81 (2d Cir. 2005); see also Natural Res. 
Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n, 597 F. Supp. 2d 370, 391 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (finding that the Commission’s opinion letter regarding the phthalate 
proscriptions of the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act “does not demonstrate 
the thoroughness of consideration and validity of reasoning that would warrant deference 
under Skidmore”). 
274 See 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(5)(A); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 
U.S. 837, 842–45 (1984). 
275 See generally NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 253, 
263–64 (1995) (holding that the Comptroller’s interpretation of the National Bank Act 
regarding the brokerage of annuities is reasonable and finding that “any change in the 
Comptroller’s position might reduce, but would not eliminate, the deference . . . owe[d] 
[to] his reasoned determinations”); Baptista v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, 640 F.3d 1194, 
1198 n.2 (11th Cir. 2011) (finding that the Comptroller’s interpretation of the term “cus-
tomer” to include “any person presenting a check for payment” was supported by the Na-
tional Bank Act and the Comptroller’s regulation promulgated thereunder, and, thus, 
that it was not unreasonable); Colaio v. Feinberg, 262 F. Supp. 2d 273, 279, 289, 300 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding the Special Master’s interpretive policies with respect to the Sep-
tember 11th Victim Compensation Fund in the Air Transportation Safety and System Sta-
bilization Act to be valid under Skidmore because the “policies do not contradict the Act or 
its regulations, are supported by evidence and valid reasoning . . . are persuasive as carry-
ing out congressional intent . . . [and thus] are reasonable and proper implementations 
of the Act and regulations”); Hadley v. Workforce Appeals Bd., 303 P.3d 1037, 1040 
(Utah Ct. App. 2013) (finding that “[a] claimant acts reasonably where ‘the decision to 
quit [is] logical, sensible, or practical’” (quoting Utah Admin. Code R994-405-
103(1)(a))). 
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Feinberg, a federal district court held that a Special Master’s interpre-
tive policies with regard to the September 11th Victim Compensation 
Fund were valid under the Skidmore standard because, inter alia, the 
policies “[were] supported by evidence and valid reasoning,” and 
were therefore reasonable.276  Additionally, in Hadley v. Workforce Ap-
peals Board, the court explained that a claimant for unemployment 
benefits “act[ed] reasonably” when, inter alia, the decision to resign is 
“logical, sensible, or practical . . . .”277 Thus, borrowing from other 
fields of law, this prong may be interpreted to be a codification of the 
Chevron reasonableness standard.278  Nevertheless, this prong will like-
ly be the crux of a court’s standard of review analysis. 
The third prong requires a court to assess whether the decision is 
consistent with the Comptroller’s other valid determinations.279  As 
discussed in this Part, this prong historically has been applied by 
courts in reviewing the Comptroller’s decisions under the Chevron 
standard.280  Thus, this prong does not change the standard applied 
to the Comptroller’s determinations; rather, this prong merely codi-
fies judicial precedent. 
The fourth prong provides a reviewing court with discretion to 
consider any other persuasive and relevant factors.281  This formula-
tion is a slight variation of the Skidmore standard, which provides for a 
court to consider “all those factors which give [the agency] power to 
persuade.”282  Courts have interpreted this prong of the Skidmore 
standard to include consideration of the agency’s thoroughness, the 
validity of its reasoning, and its consistency as factors that “either con-
tribute[] to or detract[] from the power of an agency’s interpretation 
to persuade.”283  However, additional factors may be considered, such 
as the agency’s expertise, “as factors in an agency’s power to per-
suade.”284 
In considering whether this catch-all prong introduces a more 
rigorous standard of review of the Comptroller’s preemption deci-
sions, it is notable that under the Chevron reasonableness test, courts 
 
276 Colaio, 262 F. Supp. 2d at 279, 289, 300. 
277 Hadley, 303 P.3d at 1040. 
278 See 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(5)(A); Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–45; Colaio, 262 F. Supp. 2d at 279, 
289, 300; Hadley, 303 P.3d at 1040. 
279 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(5)(A). 
280 See supra notes 227–31 and accompanying text. 
281 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(5)(A). 
282 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). 
283 Doe v. Leavitt, 552 F.3d 75, 80–81 (1st Cir. 2009) (citing Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140). 
284 Id. (citing Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore 
Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1257 (2007)). 
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are not restricted in considering any persuasive and relevant factors 
in deciding whether the agency’s interpretation is reasonable.285  
Moreover, the Comptroller’s expertise in the area of national bank-
ing law is well settled.286  Thus, any persuasive and relevant factors re-
viewed under this prong are likely to provide additional support to a 
court’s decision rather than introduce a more rigorous standard of 
review of the Comptroller’s preemption determinations. 
Thus, while the Dodd-Frank Act’s new standard of review marks a 
sea change in the level of deference to be accorded to the Comptrol-
ler in his preemption determinations,287 the ultimate effect of this re-
form may, in practice, be minimal.  All in all, the standard of review 
to be used in reviewing agency actions has always been a source of 
debate,288 and Congress’s decision to employ a new standard to be 
used in reviewing the Comptroller’s determinations to preempt state 
laws will likely be a source of continuing disagreement and idiosyn-
cratic application by the courts. 
The next Subpart addresses the issue of subsidiary preemption.  
While the Dodd-Frank Act endeavored to provide a meaningful re-
form in this area of preemption law, the effort is based on an un-
founded premise. 
C.  Subsidiaries of National Banks 
Prior to the Dodd-Frank Act, the preemption law with respect to sub-
sidiaries of national banks was governed by the Supreme Court’s de-
cision in Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A.289  An analysis of the case is 
worthwhile to appreciate the many considerations involved in the is-
sue of subsidiary preemption. 
1.  Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A. 
 The Watters case addressed the question of whether the mortgage 
lending activities conducted by an operating subsidiary of a national 
bank were subject to state reporting, licensing, and visitorial re-
 
285 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–66 (1984) 
(considering how clearly Congress has spoken on the issue and the reasonableness of the 
agency’s interpretation without limiting the factors considered in the analysis; the Court 
considered, inter alia, the statutory language and the legislative history). 
286 See supra note 216 and accompanying text. 
287 See 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(5)(A) (2012). 
288 Zaring, supra note 203, at 138, 152; see also Funk, supra note 238, at 1253 (“The doctrine 
describing judicial deference to federal agency opinions is riddled with inconsistencies 
and disparate application.”). 
289 Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1 (2007). 
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quirements.290  Specifically, the case concerned a Michigan state law 
that required “mortgage brokers, lenders and servicers that are sub-
sidiaries of national banks to register with the [state] and submit to 
state supervision.”291  In addition, the Michigan law authorized the 
state commissioner to “take regulatory or enforcement action against 
covered lenders” under the state statute.292  Wachovia Bank was a na-
tional bank that conducted its real estate lending activities through a 
state-chartered, wholly owned corporation approved by the Comp-
troller as an operating subsidiary of Wachovia Bank.293 
As discussed by the Watters Court, the National Bank Act provides 
national banks with an express authorization to “engage in real estate 
lending.”294  Further, the statute permits national banks “[t]o exer-
cise . . . all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the 
business of banking.”295  A national bank’s incidental powers include 
the power to “conduct certain activities through ‘operating subsidiar-
ies.’”296  Such “operating subsidiaries” are “authorized to engage solely 
in activities the [national] bank itself could undertake, and [are] sub-
ject to the same terms and conditions as those applicable to the [na-
tional] bank.”297 
As the Court pointed out, the Comptroller supervises operating 
subsidiaries of national banks in the same manner as national 
banks.298  Moreover, the Comptroller “treats national banks and their 
operating subsidiaries as a single economic enterprise” and “appl[ies] 
the same controls whether banking ‘activities are conducted directly 
or through an operating subsidiary.’”299 
Citing the Barnett decision, the Watters Court found that the de-
termination of preemption focuses “on the exercise of a bank’s pow-
 
290 Id. at 7, 14 (“Visitation . . . is the act of a superior or superintending officer, who visits a 
corporation to examine into its manner of conducting business, and enforce an ob-
servance of its laws and regulations.” (quoting Guthrie v. Harkness, 199 U.S. 148, 158 
(1905))). 
291 Id. at 8 (citing MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 445.1656(1) (2002), 445.1679(1)(a) (2002), 
493.52(1) (1998), 493.53a(d) (1998)). 
292 Id. at 9–10. 
293 Id. at 7. 
294 Id. at 7, 12 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 371). 
295 Id. at 7, 11 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 24). 
296 Id. at 7, 15–16 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 24a(g)(3)(A); 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(e) (2006)). 
297 Id. at 7, 18 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 24a(g)(3)(A); 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(e)). 
298 Id. at 16 (citing 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(e)(3)); see also U.S. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE 
CURRENCY, RELATED ORGANIZATIONS:  COMPTROLLER’S HANDBOOK 53 (2004) [hereinafter 
COMPTROLLER’S HANDBOOK] (“Operating subsidiaries are subject to the same supervision 
and regulation as the parent bank, except where otherwise provided by law or OCC regu-
lation.”). 
299 Watters, 550 U.S. at 17. 
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ers, not on its corporate structure.”300  According to the Watters Court, 
“[a] national bank has the power to engage in real estate lending 
through an operating subsidiary, subject to the same terms and con-
ditions that govern the national bank itself; that power cannot be sig-
nificantly impaired or impeded by state law.”301 
Moreover, “[t]o prevent inconsistent or intrusive state regulation 
from impairing” the powers granted to national banks, the National 
Bank Act provides that “‘[n]o national bank shall be subject to any 
visitorial powers except as authorized by Federal law,’ vested in the 
courts of justice.”302  As stated by the Watters Court, the National Bank 
Act was specifically “designed to prevent” the “diverse and duplicative 
superintendence of national banks” by the states.303 
Thus, the Court held that the mortgage lending activities of Wa-
chovia Bank, “whether conducted by the bank itself or through the 
bank’s operating subsidiary, [were] subject to” the sole superintend-
ence of the Comptroller of the Currency.304  Neither the national 
bank nor its operating subsidiary was subject to state mandated re-
porting, licensing, or visitorial requirements.305 
2.  Reversal of Watters by the Dodd-Frank Act 
 In the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress addressed preemption with re-
spect to subsidiaries and affiliates of national banks.306  A State con-
sumer financial law will be applicable to any “subsidiary or affiliate of 
a national bank” that is not itself a national bank “to the same extent 
that the State consumer financial law applies to any person, corpora-
tion, or other entity subject to such State law.”307  Under this provi-
sion, the Dodd-Frank Act eliminated preemption for operating sub-
sidiaries of national banks with respect to State consumer financial 
laws.308 
The Dodd-Frank Act further provides that the “applicability of any 
State law to any subsidiary or affiliate of a national bank” that is not 
 
300 Id. at 18 (citing Barnett Bank of Marion Cnty., N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 32 (1996)). 
301 Id. at 21 (citing Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 33–34; 12 U.S.C §§ 24 (Seventh), 24a(g)(3)(A), 
371). 
302 Id. at 11, 13–14 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 484(a)). 
303 Id. at 13–14; see also id. at 11 (“[F]ederal control shields national banks from unduly bur-
densome and duplicative state regulation.”). 
304 Id. at 7. 
305 Id. (explaining that reporting, licensing and visitorial requirements mandated by the state 
do not apply to the national bank or its operating subsidiary). 
306 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(2), (e), (h)(2) (2012). 
307 Id. § 25b(e). 
308 Id. 
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itself a national bank will not be preempted, annulled, or affected by 
the federal banking laws.309  Thus, the Dodd-Frank Act reversed the 
Watters opinion and eliminated preemption for operating subsidiaries 
of national banks with respect to all state laws, not only State con-
sumer financial laws.310  Therefore, operating subsidiaries of national 
banks must comply with all state laws.311 
A clarifying distinction should be made here.  As discussed in Part 
II.A, with respect to national banks, the Dodd-Frank Act does not ad-
dress the preemption of state laws other than State consumer finan-
cial laws.312  Thus, as it pertains to national banks, the Dodd-Frank Act 
addresses preemption of State consumer financial laws only.313  How-
ever, with respect to subsidiaries of national banks, the Dodd-Frank 
Act addresses all state laws and eliminates preemption of all state laws 
for subsidiaries of national banks.314 
3.  Elimination of Subsidiary Preemption 
 While these provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act were enacted in the 
spirit of reform, the elimination of preemption for subsidiaries of na-
tional banks will be exceedingly more burdensome on the national 
charter.  National banks must ensure that every subsidiary complies 
not only with federal law but also with the particular laws of the many 
states in which the subsidiary is doing business.315  Moreover, these 
provisions appear to be based on one of two concerns:  (i) the con-
cern that an operating subsidiary of a national bank engaged in 
mortgage activities would unduly benefit from the preemption of 
state laws by conducting its mortgage lending business in a manner 
that would harm the inhabitants of the particular state, or (ii) the 
concern that an operating subsidiary of a national bank engaged in 
mortgage activities would unduly benefit by the preemption of state 
laws by conducting its mortgage lending business unfettered by state 
laws while its state-regulated competitors would be held to those state 
laws, thereby creating an unequal playing field in favor of the nation-
al bank subsidiaries.316 
 
309 Id. § 25b(b)(2), (h)(2) (emphasis added). 
310 Id. § 25b(b)(2), (e), (h)(2); see Watters, 550 U.S. at 7. 
311 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(2), (e), (h)(2). 
312 See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
313 12 U.S.C. § 25b. 
314 Id. § 25b(b)(2), (e), (h)(2). 
315 Id. 
316 See generally 156 CONG. REC. S5870-02 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (explaining that one of the 
purposes of the Dodd-Frank Act is “to protect consumers”); see also Watters v. Wachovia 
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With respect to the first concern, as found by the Supreme Court 
in the Watters opinion, the Comptroller regulates a national bank and 
its operating subsidiaries as one economic unit.317  Both the Comp-
troller and Congress have viewed a national bank and its operating 
subsidiaries as a single economic enterprise “for accounting purpos-
es, regulatory reporting purposes, and for purposes of applying many 
Federal statutory or regulatory limits.”318  Similarly, in determining 
whether national banks have the power to engage in new activities, 
the Supreme Court has consistently viewed national banks and their 
operating subsidiaries as a single entity.319  Moreover, Congress has 
expressly provided that an operating subsidiary of a national bank 
may engage “solely in activities that national banks are permitted to 
engage in directly and are conducted subject to the same terms and 
conditions that govern the conduct of such activities by national 
banks.”320  Thus, operating subsidiaries are subject to the same rigors 
of regulatory oversight the Comptroller applies to the parent national 
bank.321 
Perhaps due to the regulatory oversight, operating subsidiaries of 
national banks were not responsible for originating the vast majority 
of subprime mortgages in the years leading up to the subprime mort-
gage crisis.322  Rather, as will be discussed in Part III.B, state-regulated 
lending institutions, for which federal preemption did not apply, 
were responsible for underwriting the overwhelming majority of sub-
prime mortgages.323  Moreover, evidence indicates that subprime 
lenders regulated by the states, in particular independent mortgage 
 
Bank, N.A. 550 U.S. 1, 43 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he primary advantage of 
maintaining an operating subsidiary as a separate corporation is that it shields the na-
tional bank from the operating subsidiaries’ liabilities. . . . The federal interest in protect-
ing depositors in national banks from their subsidiaries’ liabilities surely does not justify a 
grant of immunity from laws that apply to competitors.”). 
317 Watters, 530 U.S. at 17 (citing COMPTROLLER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 298, at 64). 
318 Brief Amicus Curiae of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency in Support of Plain-
tiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 7 & n.5, Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Watters, 334 F. 
Supp. 2d 957 (W.D. Mich. 2004) (Civ. Act. No. 5:03-CV-0105), aff’d, 550 U.S. 1 (2007) 
(citing 12 U.S.C. § 371c(b)(2)(A); 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(e)(4)). 
319 See, e.g., NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 254 
(1995) (permitting sale of annuities by operating subsidiary); Marquette Nat’l Bank v. 
First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299, 301–02 (1978) (permitting credit card subsidi-
ary to employ the usury laws of its home state when issuing credit cards in another state). 
320 12 U.S.C. § 24a(g)(3)(A) (2012).  In contrast, other affiliates of national banks may en-
gage in activities that are not permitted for national banks to engage in directly.  See id. 
§24a(a)(2)(A)(i)  (authorizing financial subsidiaries to engage in activities that are “fi-
nancial in nature or incidental to a financial activity”). 
321 Watters, 550 U.S. at 17 (citing COMPTROLLER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 298, at 64). 
322 See infra note 443 and accompanying text. 
323 See infra notes 438–42 and accompanying text. 
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companies regulated solely by the states, engaged in abusive lending 
practices.324  For example, Congress has found that many prospective 
borrowers were steered into accepting mortgage loans they could not 
afford.325  Therefore, operating subsidiaries of national banks did not 
unduly benefit from the preemption of state laws.  Instead, state-
regulated lending institutions were the entities that conducted their 
mortgage lending businesses in a manner that harmed the inhabit-
ants of the state in which they were operating. 
With respect to the second concern, the operating subsidiaries of 
national banks are held to federal law by the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency.326  In contrast, as further discussed in Part III.B, nothing in the 
doctrine of preemption prevented the states from regulating and en-
forcing state laws with respect to state-regulated lending institutions, 
for which federal preemption did not apply.327  Yet, these state-
regulated institutions were responsible for originating the vast major-
ity of subprime mortgages, despite the unfettered ability of the states 
to regulate these lenders.328  Clearly, the market recognized this im-
balance in regulatory oversight, as evidenced by the significant share 
of subprime mortgages originated by state-regulated lending institu-
tions.329  As a result, national banks and their operating subsidiaries 
were, in effect, unduly harmed by the apparent difference in regula-
tory oversight applied to the state-regulated lending institutions, 
thereby creating an unequal playing field in favor of the state-regulated 
lenders and not the other way around. 
For example, the subprime mortgage crisis caused an overall mar-
ket decline in housing prices.330  As a result, many homeowners expe-
rienced negative equity.331  Negative equity, or more commonly an 
“underwater” mortgage, occurs when the value of the home is re-
duced below the mortgage balance.332  While declines in housing 
prices initially affected subprime loans because these mortgages gen-
erally included minimal or no down payments, as housing prices con-
 
324 See infra notes 436, 453–54 and accompanying text. 
325 156 CONG. REC. S5870 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (Remarks of Sen. Akaka) (“Prospective 
homebuyers were steered into mortgage products that had risks and costs that they could 
not understand or afford.”). 
326 Watters, 550 U.S. at 16–17. 
327 See infra notes 434–37 and accompanying text. 
328 See infra notes 438–42 and accompanying text. 
329 See infra notes 439, 441 and accompanying text. 
330 The Downturn in Facts and Figures, BBC NEWS, Nov. 21, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/business/7073131.stm. 
331 Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., supra note 2, at 3–4. 
332 Id. at 4. 
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tinued to decline, “even many prime borrowers who had made sizea-
ble down payments fell underwater,” resulting in a high level of de-
linquencies in the housing finance market.333  For example, NBT 
Bancorp Inc., the holding company of NBT Bank, National Associa-
tion, was not active in the subprime mortgage market.334  Yet, delin-
quencies in the bank’s residential mortgages increased nearly five 
times between 2007 and 2012.335  Moreover, losses on residential real 
estate loans during the same time period more than tripled.336  Thus, 
national banks and their operating subsidiaries were unduly harmed 
by the decline in housing prices.  This decline was set in motion by 
the state-regulated lending institutions, which originated the over-
whelming majority of subprime mortgages,337 ultimately resulting in 
the subprime mortgage crisis.338 
As another example, some national banks acquired investments in 
mortgage-backed securities backed by “poorly underwritten subprime 
mortgages, unduly relying on the investment grade ratings” of these 
securities.339  Mortgage-backed securities are created by pooling to-
gether various mortgages and creating a debt security that is sold to 
investors.340  When the subprime mortgage market collapsed, many of 
these mortgage-backed securities became impaired causing losses to 
investors, including national banks.341 
 
333 Id. at 5. 
334 NBT BANCORP INC., 2012 ANNUAL REPORT 41 (2013) (noting that “[s]ubprime mortgage 
lending, which has been the riskiest sector of the residential housing market, is not a 
market that [NBT Bancorp Inc.] has ever actively pursued,” instead, NBT Bancorp Inc. “is 
a prime lender”). 
335 Residential real estate mortgages placed on nonaccrual status increased from $1,372,000 
in 2007 to $8,083,000 in 2012.  Compare NBT BANCORP INC., 2007 ANNUAL REPORT 30 
(2008), with NBT BANCORP INC., 2012 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 334, at 49.   Loans are 
placed on nonaccrual status, that is, interest is no longer accrued on the loans, when 
payments become delinquent.  Compare NBT BANCORP INC., 2012 ANNUAL REPORT, supra 
note 334, at 71, with NBT BANCORP INC., 2007 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 335, at 52.  
336 FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, UNIFORM BANK PERFORMANCE REPORT (2007), 
available at https://cdr.ffiec.gov/public/Reports/UbprReport.aspx?rptCycleIds=47%
2c72%2c45%2c44%2c43&rptid=283&idrssd=702117&peerGroupType=&supplemental 
(last visited Mar. 31, 2013) (recording that losses on residential real estate mortgages, as a 
percentage of total loans, increased from 0.07% in 2007 to 0.29% in 2012). 
337 See infra notes 439, 441 and accompanying text. 
338 See infra note 404 and accompanying text. 
339 OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, STATEMENT OF JOHN C. DUGAN, 
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, BEFORE THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION 9–
10 (2010) [hereinafter Statement of John C. Dugan]. 
340 See Adam B. Ashcraft & Til Schuermann, Understanding the Securitization of Subprime Mort-
gage Credit, 318 FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y. STAFF REP 5 (2008), available at 
https://www.econstor.eu/dspace/bitstream/10419/60823/1/587537833.pdf.  
341 See generally KATALINA M. BIANCO, THE SUBPRIME LENDING CRISIS:   CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF 
THE MORTGAGE MELTDOWN 12–15 (2008), available at http://business.cch.com/
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In sum, the elimination of preemption for subsidiaries of national 
banks will be particularly burdensome on the national charter and is 
regrettably based upon an unfounded premise.  Undoubtedly, na-
tional banks will respond to this change by merging their operating 
subsidiaries into the parent bank rather than incurring the burden-
some cost of complying with the diverse laws of the fifty states. 
The following Subpart will discuss the visitorial powers provision 
of the National Bank Act and the ability of the states to enforce laws 
against national banks. 
C.  Visitation 
 The National Bank Act provides that “[n]o national bank shall be 
subject to any visitorial powers except as authorized by Federal law, 
vested in the courts of justice.”342  The Comptroller had issued a regu-
lation interpreting the term “visitorial powers” to include “conduct-
ing examinations, inspecting or requiring the production of books or 
records of national banks, or prosecuting enforcement actions” 
against national banks.343  The regulation also affirmed that only the 
Comptroller of the Currency “may exercise visitorial powers with re-
spect to national banks . . . .”344 Thus, under the Comptroller’s regula-
tion, only the Comptroller of the Currency had the authority to pros-
ecute enforcement actions against national banks.345 
The Supreme Court considered the statutory term “visitorial pow-
ers” in Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n and found the Comptroller had 
reasonably interpreted “visitorial powers” to include “conducting ex-
aminations and inspecting or requiring the production of books or 
records of national banks.”346  However, the Supreme Court did not 
find reasonable the Comptroller’s extension of the term “visitorial 
powers” to include prosecuting enforcement actions in state court.347  
According to the Court, a state’s visitorial powers should be distin-
 
bankingfinance/focus/news/Subprime_WP_rev.pdf (“[T]ens of billions of dollars worth 
of mortgage-backed paper all but disappeared.”). 
342 12 U.S.C. § 484(a) (2012). 
343 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000(a) (2009). 
344 Id. 
345 See Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, 557 U.S. 519, 525 (2009) (noting that the Comptrol-
ler’s “regulation prohibits the States from prosecuting enforcement actions” with respect 
to national banks (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Nat’l State Bank, Eliza-
beth, N.J. v. Long, 630 F.2d 981, 989 (3d Cir. 1980) (“[E]nforcement of the state statute is 
the responsibility of the Comptroller of the Currency rather than the State Commission-
er.”). 
346 Cuomo, 557 U.S. at 535–36. 
347 Id. at 525, 536.  
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guished from its power to enforce the law, and only the former is 
preempted by the National Bank Act.348  Moreover, the purpose of the 
statute’s reservation of powers “vested in the courts of justice” was in-
tended to preserve the courts’ ordinary powers of enforcing the law.349  
Thus, the Court held that a state attorney general is permitted to 
bring judicial enforcement actions against national banks.350 
 Remarkably, the Cuomo Court asserted that its prior decision in 
Watters was fully in accord with the distinction between supervision 
and law enforcement.351  However, the state regulations preempted in 
Watters included the power to enforce the law.352  One may query how 
the Court’s prior decision in Watters was fully in accord with the dis-
tinction between supervision and law enforcement, when the Watters 
decision preempted a state law that included the power of law en-
forcement.  Yet, the Cuomo Court did not address this inconsistency in 
its reasoning.  Rather, the Cuomo Court maintained that “the sole 
question [in Watters] was whether operating subsidiaries of national 
banks enjoyed the same immunity from state visitation” as the parent 
national bank.353  Thus, the Cuomo Court narrowed the scope of the 
Watters decision to apply only to the question of how operating sub-
sidiaries of national banks are to be treated with respect to state visita-
tion,354 without acknowledging that state visitation in the Watters case 
included the power to enforce the law.355 
Congress also addressed the issue of visitorial powers in the Dodd-
Frank Act.  In accordance with the Supreme Court’s decision in Cuo-
mo, the visitation provisions of federal banking law do not limit or re-
strict the authority of a state attorney general “to enforce an applica-
ble law” against a national bank by bringing an action in court.356  
 
348 Id. at 526–29. 
349 Id. at 530. 
350 Id. at 536. 
351 Id. at 528. 
352 Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A. 550 U.S. 1, 9–10 (2007); see also Cuomo, 557 U.S. at 552 
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court was fully aware that the Michigan statutes [in Wat-
ters] granted state banking commissioners the very enforcement authority that petitioner 
seeks to exert over the national banks in this case.”). 
353 Id. at 528. 
354 See id. at 528–29 (stating explicitly that “[t]he opinion addresses and answers no other 
question”). 
355 See id. at 552–53 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s conclusion in Watters that § 
484(a) deprives the States of inspection and enforcement authority over the mortgage-
lending practices of national banks lends weight to the agency’s construction of the stat-
ute.”). 
356 12 U.S.C. § 25b(i)(1) (2012).  However, a state attorney general is restricted in conduct-
ing non-judicial investigations or oversight of a national bank.  See 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000(b) 
(2011). 
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Thus, the Dodd-Frank Act codified the Cuomo decision.357  A state at-
torney general has the authority to bring an action against a national 
bank in court to enforce a non-preempted state law.358  These visitori-
al powers provisions apply to federal thrifts and their subsidiaries “to 
the same extent and in the same manner” as national banks and na-
tional bank subsidiaries.359 
The codification of the Cuomo decision may result in any of three 
potential outcomes.  The states may serve as a back-up enforcement 
authority to the federal regulators.  For example, if a federal regula-
tor fails to enforce an applicable law against a national bank, a feder-
al thrift, or their respective subsidiaries, then the states may use this 
enforcement power to bring an action in court to enforce that law.  
Alternatively, the states may use this enforcement power collabora-
tively by working together with the federal regulator to ensure that 
applicable laws are enforced.  Then again, the states may choose to 
work independently of the federal regulator, potentially resulting in 
the duplicative enforcement regimes that the Watters Court sought to 
avoid.360 
Additionally, as discussed in Part III.B, states have always had the 
sole power to regulate and enforce applicable laws with respect to in-
dependent mortgage companies.361  Notwithstanding this absolute au-
thority held by the states, independent mortgage companies were re-
sponsible for originating the vast majority of subprime mortgage 
loans.362  With the codification of the Cuomo decision,363 it remains to 
be seen whether or not the states will use this relatively new enforce-
ment power with respect to national banks and federal thrifts in an 
effective manner. 
The next Subpart will explore the doctrine of preemption regard-
ing federal savings associations and the particularly apposite reform 
established by the Dodd-Frank Act. 
 
357 See 12 U.S.C. § 25b(i)(1) (noting the statute expressly states that it is “[i]n accordance 
with the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Cuomo ”). 
358 See Dodd-Frank Implementation, supra note 3, at 43,552 (grounding its assertion on the 
Supreme Court opinion in Cuomo). 
359 12 U.S.C. § 1465(c) . 
360 See Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A. 550 U.S. 1, 13–14 (2007) (noting the National Bank 
Act was specifically “designed to prevent” the “diverse and duplicative superintendence of 
national banks” by the states). 
361 See infra note 442 and accompanying text. 
362 See infra note 441 and accompanying text. 
363 See 12 U.S.C. § 25b(i)(1) . 
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D.  Federal Savings Associations 
 As discussed in Part I.A, the Home Owner’s Loan Act was viewed 
by some courts as occupying the field with respect to federal savings 
associations.364  For example, the Ninth Circuit has held that “federal 
law preempts the field of prepayments of real estate loans to federally 
chartered savings and loan associations, so that any California law in 
the area is inapplicable to federal savings and loan associations oper-
ating within California.”365  Moreover, a field preemption standard for 
federal savings associations was explicitly set forth in regulations 
promulgated by the Office of Thrift Supervision (“OTS”), the prior 
regulator of federal thrifts.366  As provided by the regulations, the OTS 
“occupies the entire field of . . . deposit-related regulations” and the 
“entire field of lending regulation” with respect to federal savings as-
sociations.367  Even the Supreme Court has given an implicit nod to 
the field preemption doctrine for federal savings associations.  As ex-
pressed by the Court in Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan v. de la Cuesta, 
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (the first regulator of federal 
thrifts)368 was authorized by the HOLA to promulgate comprehensive 
“regulations governing ‘the powers and operations of every [f]ederal 
savings and loan association from its cradle to its corporate grave.’”369  
More specifically, the Court found that the “broad language of the 
[HOLA] expresses no limits on the [Federal Home Loan Bank] 
Board’s authority to regulate the lending practices of federal savings 
and loans.”370 
 
364 See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text. 
365 Meyers v. Beverly Hills Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 499 F.2d 1145, 1147 (9th Cir. 1974). 
366 See 12 U.S.C. §§ 5411, 5412 (transferring all functions of the Office of Thrift Supervision 
with respect to federal savings associations to the Office of the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency effective July 21, 2011). 
367 12 C.F.R. § 557.11(b) (2011) (authorizing the scope of authority with respect to deposit-
related regulations); id. § 560.2(a) (authorizing the scope of authority with respect to 
lending regulation). 
368 See Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 144 (1982) (“The [Federal 
Home Loan Bank] Board . . . was formed in 1932 and thereafter was vested with  plenary 
authority to administer the Home Owners’ Loan Act of 1933 . . . .” (citation omitted)). 
369 Id. at 144–45 (quoting California v. Coast Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 98 F. Supp. 311, 316 
(S.D. Cal. 1951)); Meyers, 499 F.2d at 1146–47 (quoting Coast Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 98 F. 
Supp. at 316). 
370 de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 161  (emphasis added) (“Congress plainly envisioned that federal 
savings and loans would be governed by what the Board-not any particular state-deemed 
to be the ‘best practices.’”); see also First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Bos. v. Tax Comm’n of 
Mass., 437 U.S. 255, 258 n.3 (1978) (noting that the HOLA “protects federal associations 
from being forced into the state regulatory mold”). 
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However, as part of the reform legislation, the Dodd-Frank Act 
changed the preemption standards applicable to federal savings asso-
ciations to conform to the legal standards applicable to national 
banks.371  Congress also expressly provided that the Home Owners’ 
Loan Act372 “does not occupy the field in any area of [s]tate law.”373  
Thus, federal savings associations will no longer benefit from field 
preemption.  Instead, in accordance with the legal standards applica-
ble to national banks, the conflict preemption standard of Barnett will 
be applied to federal thrifts.374  Moreover, operating subsidiaries of 
federal thrifts will no longer benefit from any type of preemption.  
Instead, in accordance with the legal standards applicable to operat-
ing subsidiaries of national banks, operating subsidiaries of federal 
thrifts will be subject to relevant state laws.375 
In considering this change in the preemption standard for federal 
thrifts from field preemption to conflict preemption,376 it is important 
to understand the initial divergence in preemption standards be-
tween national banks and federal thrifts.  As provided in the HOLA, 
one of the primary purposes for the creation of thrift institutions was 
to provide financing for home ownership.377  Indeed, the Supreme 
Court has noted that the “HOLA, a product of the Great Depression 
of the 1930’s, was intended ‘to provide emergency relief with respect 
to home mortgage indebtedness’ at a time when as many as half of all 
home loans in the country were in default.”378  Thus, Congress enact-
ed the HOLA to “provide[] for the creation of a system of federal sav-
 
371 12 U.S.C. § 1465(a) (“Any determination by a court or by the Director [of the Office of 
Thrift Supervision] or any successor officer or agency regarding the relation of a State law 
to a provision of this chapter or any regulation or order prescribed under this chapter 
shall be made in accordance with the laws and legal standards applicable to national 
banks regarding the preemption of State law.”). 
372 Id. §§ 1461–1470. 
373 Id. § 1465(b). 
374 Id. § 25b(b)  (noting that “in accordance with the legal standard for preemption in the 
decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Barnett Bank of Marion County,” a 
State consumer financial law is preempted if “the State consumer financial law prevents 
or significantly interferes with the exercise by the national bank of its powers”); see supra 
notes 371, 373 and accompanying text. 
375 See 12 U.S.C. §§ 25b(b)(2), (e), (h)(2), 1465(a); 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.4010(a), 34.6 (2011). 
376 Dodd-Frank Implementation, supra note 3, at 43,556 n.48 (noting that a conflict preemp-
tion standard “is in contrast to the [Office of Thrift Supervision’s] preemption rules, 
which assert an ‘occupation of the field’ preemption standard for Federal savings associa-
tions”). 
377 See 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a). 
378 Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 159 (1982) (quoting H.R. REP. 
NO. 210, at 1 (1933) (Conf. Rep.)).  
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ings and loan associations . . . ‘to promote the thrift of the peo-
ple . . . to finance their homes and the homes of their neighbors.’”379 
Therefore, the policy underlying the field preemption doctrine 
for federal savings associations was to protect the powers of federal 
savings associations in providing credit for individuals to purchase a 
home.380  In contrast, national banks did not share this same funda-
mental purpose to promote home ownership, and thus did not bene-
fit from field preemption of state laws.  Rather, the courts historically 
have relegated national banks to the higher standard of conflict 
preemption.381  While a field preemption standard was not universally 
applied by the courts,382 the benefits of a field preemption standard 
for federal savings associations in certain jurisdictions should not be 
underestimated.  For example, in the Ninth Circuit, the courts have 
consistently held that federal law occupied the field with respect to 
federal thrifts.383  Thus, many California state laws were preempted 
 
379 Id. at 160 (quoting S. REP. NO. 91, at 2 (1933)). 
380 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a) (specifying that thrift institutions are created “for the deposit of 
funds and for the extension of credit for homes and other goods and services . . . . The 
lending and investment powers conferred . . . are intended to encourage such institutions 
to provide credit for housing safely and soundly”); California v. Coast Fed. Sav. & Loan 
Ass’n, 98 F. Supp. 311, 316 (S.D. Cal. 1951) (finding one of the purposes for the creation 
of federal savings and loan associations is to provide financing for home ownership). 
381 See, e.g., Barnett Bank of Marion Cnty., N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996); see also Frank-
lin Nat’l Bank of Franklin Square v. New York, 347 U.S. 373, 375–79 (1954) (holding that 
a federal statute permitting national banks to accept savings deposits preempts a conflict-
ing state statute prohibiting the use of the word “savings” in the advertising of certain 
state and national banks); First Nat’l Bank of San Jose v. California, 262 U.S. 366, 368–69 
(1923) (finding that national banks’ “power” to receive deposits preempts contrary state 
escheat law). 
382 Some courts did apply a conflict preemption standard for federal savings and loan associ-
ations.  See, e.g., de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 159, 170 (implicitly acknowledging the doctrine 
of field preemption for federal thrifts while still applying a conflict preemption standard 
in holding that a federal regulation permitting federal savings and loan associations to 
enforce due-on-sale clauses preempted a conflicting state law).  Thus, the impact of a 
conflict preemption standard on federal thrifts may not be significant in certain areas, 
such as the law regarding due-on-sale clauses. 
383 See, e.g., Meyers v. Beverly Hills Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 499 F.2d 1145, 1147 (9th Cir. 
1974) (“[F]ederal law preempts the field of prepayments of real estate loans to federally 
chartered savings and loan associations, so that any California law in the area is inappli-
cable to federal savings and loan associations operating within California.”); Glendale 
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Fox, 459 F. Supp. 903, 911 (C.D. Cal. 1978) (“The Ninth Circuit 
has taken the position that Congress, in the HOLA, delegated to the [Federal Home 
Loan] Bank Board the authority to regulate the operations of federal savings and loan as-
sociations to the exclusion of state regulation.”); Coast Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 98 F. Supp. 
at  318 (“[T]he [Home Owners’ Loan] [A]ct . . . which authorized the creation, opera-
tion and supervision of federal savings and loan associations . . . embrace[s] the entire 
field . . . . It seems clear that Congress has preempted the field, making invalid the state 
statutes plaintiffs rely upon . . . when attempted to be invoked against a Federal savings 
and loan association.”). 
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without the need to apply the more rigorous standard of conflict 
preemption. 
While the policy underlying a field preemption standard for fed-
eral thrifts, that of helping to provide home ownership to our na-
tion’s citizens, has been a long-standing hallmark of our national pol-
icy,384 the use of a field preemption doctrine for federal thrifts in 
order to further the national policy of home ownership was misguid-
ed.  As now firmly established by the Dodd-Frank Act,385 federal thrifts 
should be held to the same preemption standards as national banks.  
There are three reasons for this conclusion. 
First and foremost, the National Bank Act was passed with the un-
derlying policy of creating a system of national banks authorized to 
issue a uniform national currency.386  A uniform national currency 
would, in turn, facilitate interstate commerce.387  However, courts his-
torically did not apply a preemption of the field standard for national 
banks in order to further the national policy goal of facilitating inter-
state commerce.388  Even in modern times, where national banks facil-
itate interstate commerce through deposit services, trust and invest-
ment services, and commercial and consumer lending activities,389 
courts still do not apply a preemption of the field standard for na-
tional banks.390 
 
384 See supra notes 377–79 and accompanying text. 
385 See supra notes 371–75 and accompanying text. 
386 12 U.S.C. § 38 (2012) (“The Act entitled ‘An Act to provide a national currency . . . and 
to provide for the circulation and redemption thereof,’ approved June 3, 1864, shall be 
known as ‘The National Bank Act.’”); CARNELL ET AL., supra note 13, at 8–9; ROSS M. 
ROBERTSON, THE COMPTROLLER & BANK SUPERVISION:  A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 45 
(1995 ed.).  
387 See Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533, 548 (1869) (finding that “Congress has 
undertaken to supply a currency for the entire country” which may be used “in all the 
transactions of commerce”). 
388 See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank of San Jose v. California, 262 U.S. 366, 368–69 (1923) (finding 
that national banks’ “power” to receive deposits preempts contrary state escheat law). 
389 MICHAEL P. MALLOY, BANKING & FINANCIAL SERVICES LAW 27–28 (2d ed. 2005) 
(“[C]ommercial banks [(i.e., national banks and state banks)] are authorized to offer the 
full range of banking services, including demand accounts (i.e., checking accounts) for 
business and personal use, savings and time deposits, investment and loan services, trust 
department services, and the like.” (emphasis omitted)). 
390 See, e.g., Barnett Bank of Marion Cnty., N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996); see also Frank-
lin Nat’l Bank of Franklin Square v. New York, 347 U.S. 373, 375–79 (1954) (holding that 
a federal statute permitting national banks to accept savings deposits preempts a conflict-
ing state statute prohibiting the use of the word “savings” in the advertising of certain 
state and national banks). 
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Second, similar to the HOLA for federal thrifts, the National Bank 
Act covers nearly every aspect of a national bank’s existence.391  
Moreover, similar to the prior regulators of federal savings associa-
tions, the Comptroller of the Currency has broad authority granted 
by the National Bank Act to regulate the operations of national 
banks.392  Yet, courts have not found that Congress, in the National 
Bank Act, intended to preempt the entire field of law with respect to 
national banks,393 nor have courts found that the Comptroller’s regu-
lations preempt the field regarding national banks.394 
Third, a consistent preemption standard for both national banks 
and federal savings associations is certainly warranted given the simi-
larities in services provided by both types of depository institutions.395  
For example, a large proportion of home mortgages are now under-
written by national banks.396  Thus, for all these reasons, preemption 
law with respect to federal thrifts should be guided by the same 
standard that applies to national banks:  a conflict preemption stand-
ard. 
The following Part will address the argument that federal preemp-
tion resulted in the subprime mortgage crisis and the financial crisis. 
 
391 See 12 U.S.C. §§ 21–216 (2012); Bank of Am. v. City of S.F., 309 F.3d 551, 558 (9th Cir. 
2002) (“[S]ince the passage of the National Bank Act in 1864, the federal presence in 
banking has been significant.” (citing Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 32–33)). 
392 See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1–216; CARNELL ET AL., supra note 13, at 61 (“[T]he Comptroller operates 
with broad autonomy reinforced by statute.”); MALLOY, supra note 389, at 40 (“Approval 
by the Comptroller is required for virtually all significant actions to be taken by a national 
bank – chartering, establishment of branches, changes in corporate control and structure 
of organization – and the [Comptroller] also supervises the day-to-day activities of nation-
al banks, including the loan and investment policies of the banks, trust activities, issuance 
of securities and the like.”); ROBERTSON, supra note 386, at 1. 
393 Idaho Dep’t of Fin. v. Sec. Pac. Bank Idaho, N.A. 800 F. Supp. 922, 925 (D. Idaho 1992) 
(“It is clear that Congress has not completely preempted the entire banking field either 
expressly or impliedly, so any preemption must arise out of an actual conflict between 
federal and state law.”). 
394 McCormick v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. 3:08-0944, 2009 WL 151588, at *2 (S.D. W. Va. Jan. 
22, 2009) (“[T]here is . . . no field preemption of national bank regulation.”). 
395 CARNELL ET AL., supra note 13, at 27–28 (“No longer do stark contrasts exist between 
commercial banks and thrift institutions. Thrifts can make commercial and consumer 
loans. They can offer credit cards, trust services, and personal and corporate checking ac-
counts. . . . Banks and their affiliates, in turn, originate a large proportion of all home 
mortgages.”). 
396 Id. at 28. 
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III.  THE FALLACY THAT FEDERAL PREEMPTION CONTRIBUTED TO THE 
FINANCIAL CRISIS 
 There are those who believe that federal preemption of state laws 
is “bad public policy” and should not be permitted.397  According to 
this line of reasoning, federal preemption allowed predatory lending 
to occur and ultimately resulted in the subprime mortgage crisis and 
the financial crisis.398  Predatory lending generally involves lending 
terms and practices that are unfair, abusive, deceptive or fraudulent 
to the borrower, and is generally associated with subprime mortgage 
loans.399  While not all subprime mortgage loans were predatory in 
nature,400 subprime mortgage loans generally were granted to indi-
viduals “with impaired or limited credit histories, or high debt rela-
tive to their income.”401  Not surprisingly, subprime mortgage loans 
experienced high rates of default.402  According to a study by the Joint 
Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University, between 2003 and 
2007, “[d]efaults on subprime loans within six to eighteen months of 
origination . . . increased with each successive” year.403  Many econo-
mists and experts in the field believe the subprime mortgage crisis 
was caused by “the combination of a number of factors in which sub-
prime lending played a major part.”404 
Another type of nonprime loan that contributed to the financial 
crisis is the Alt-A mortgage loan.405  Alt-A mortgages have better credit 
 
397 Dodd-Frank Implementation, supra note 3, at 43,553. 
398 Id.; see also Mason et al., supra note 11, at 790 (discussing arguments that blame federal 
“preemption of state banking laws” for permitting “banks to originate predatory sub-
prime . . . mortgages”); Spitzer, supra note 4, at A25 (arguing that the federal government 
engaged in an “aggressive . . . campaign” aimed at preventing the states from protecting 
consumers against predatory lending practices). 
399 U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY & U.S. HOUSING & URBAN DEV., CURBING PREDATORY HOME 
MORTGAGE LENDING: A JOINT REPORT 1 (2000), available at http://www.treasury.gov/
press-center/press-releases/Documents/treasrpt.pdf (providing a general definition of 
predatory lending). 
400 See Statement of John C. Dugan, supra note 339, at 7 (“[P]redatory lending is usually a 
subset of subprime lending, but it is different from the type of subprime lending that was 
lawful but involved exceptionally weak underwriting standards.”). 
401 U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY & U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING & URBAN DEV., supra note 399, at 13. 
402 See Bianco, supra note 341, at 6 (noting that “high default rates” were experienced on 
subprime mortgage loans granted to “higher-risk borrowers with lower income or lesser 
credit history than ‘prime’ borrowers”). 
403 JOINT CTR. FOR HOUSING STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY, THE STATE OF THE NATION’S 
HOUSING 20 (2008), available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/jchs.harvard.edu/
files/son2008.pdf. 
404 Bianco, supra note 341, at 3. 
405 See generally Prabha Natarajan, Toxic Debt Returns to Fashion, WALL ST. J., Sept. 2, 2010, at 
C6 (“Alt-A mortgages became infamous during the financial crisis for their inadequate or 
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quality than subprime loans; however, these alternative mortgage 
products have inferior credit quality when compared to prime 
loans.406  Alt-A mortgages were marketed to individuals with credit 
scores that were better than those of subprime borrowers; however, 
these alternative mortgage products required “little or no verification 
of income.”407  In addition, Alt-A mortgages generally included higher 
loan amounts relative to the value of the home, and higher debt rela-
tive to the borrower’s income, than prime loans.408  Similar to sub-
prime mortgage loans, Alt-A mortgages experienced high rates of de-
fault.409 
Keeping in mind the issues associated with nonprime mortgage 
loans, this Part will address the argument that federal preemption re-
sulted in the subprime mortgage crisis and the financial crisis and re-
veal the fallacy of this premise.  Based on independent data and an 
analysis of the preemption doctrine, this Part will demonstrate that 
federal preemption did not contribute to the crises. 
Before addressing these matters, it is important to understand the 
complex structure of the regulatory environment for different lend-
ing institutions.  This Part will first discuss the federal bank and thrift 
regulatory agencies and the financial institutions regulated by each 
agency. 
A.  The Federal Regulatory Agencies and the Institutions they Regulate 
 The federal bank and thrift regulatory agencies have evolved over 
the long history of banking.  The Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency, the first banking regulator, was established under the Na-
tional Currency Act of 1863, now known as the National Bank Act of 
1864,410 as the regulator of national banks.411  The Comptroller’s au-
 
inaccurate documentation; many failed quickly because home buyers couldn’t afford to 
make the monthly payments.”). 
406 See Patrick Bajari et al., A Dynamic Model of Subprime Mortgage Default:  Estimation and 
Policy Implication 4 n.3 (Nov. 23, 2011) (unpublished paper), available at 
http://are.berkeley.edu/documents/seminar/2011Nov23MortgageDynamic.pdf. 
407 Chris Isidore, ‘Liar loans’: Mortgage Woes Beyond Subprime, CNN MONEY (Mar. 19, 2007, 5:01 
PM), http://money.cnn.com/2007/03/19/news/economy/next_subprime/index.htm. 
408 See Bianco, supra note 341, at 6 (stating that mortgage loans classified as Alt-A exhibit an 
increased risk profile because these loans generally have “higher loan-to-value and debt-
to-income ratios” compared to prime mortgages). 
409 Id. 
410 12 U.S.C. §§ 1–216 (2012). 
411 Id.; see CARNELL ET AL., supra note 13, at 61 (“The Comptroller of the Curren-
cy . . . regulates . . . national banks”); MALLOY, supra note 389, at 19 (“Approval by the 
Comptroller is required for virtually all significant actions to be taken by a national bank–
chartering, establishment of branches, changes in corporate control and structure of or-
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thority also extends to subsidiaries of national banks.412  Under the 
Dodd-Frank Act, Congress granted the Comptroller the additional 
authority to regulate federal savings associations.413  Previously, feder-
al savings associations were regulated by the OTS.414  However, the 
Dodd-Frank Act abolished the OTS and transferred the powers and 
responsibilities of the OTS to the Comptroller of the Currency, the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”), and the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve (“Federal Reserve Board”), as fur-
ther delineated in this Subpart.415 
The Federal Reserve System was established in 1913 under the 
Federal Reserve Act.416  The Federal Reserve Board and the Federal 
Reserve banks (collectively, the “Federal Reserve”) are responsible for 
regulating bank holding companies and state-chartered banks that 
are members of the Federal Reserve System.417  The Federal Reserve 
shares the supervision of state-chartered member banks with the re-
spective states in which those banks are chartered.418  The Federal Re-
serve also has limited responsibility for regulating nonbank affiliates 
of member banks, including nonbank affiliates of national banks and 
nonbank affiliates of state member banks.419  The Federal Reserve 
shares the supervision of these nonbank affiliates with the states.420  
Under the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress granted the Federal Reserve 
Board the additional authority to regulate savings and loan holding 
 
ganization–and the [Comptroller] also supervises the day-to-day activities of national 
banks, including the loan and investment policies of the banks, trust activities, issuance of 
securities and the like.”); ROBERTSON, supra note 386, at 44–45, 81.  
412 See generally 12 U.S.C. § 24a; MALLOY, supra note 389, at 40. 
413 See generally 12 U.S.C. § 5412. 
414 The OTS previously regulated federally chartered savings associations, state-chartered 
savings associations, and savings and loan holding companies.  See id. § 5412(b).  The 
OTS shared supervision of the state-chartered savings associations with the respective 
states in which those institutions were chartered.  CARNELL ET AL., supra note 13, at 63.  
Prior to the OTS, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board was the regulator of federal and 
state thrifts and thrift holding companies.  MALLOY, supra note 389, at 51. 
415 The Dodd-Frank Act abolished the OTS and transferred its responsibilities to the other 
bank regulatory agencies effective July 21, 2011.  See 12 U.S.C. §§ 5411–5413. 
416 Federal Reserve Act, Pub. L. No. 63-43, 38 Stat. 251 (1913) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 221–
505); CARNELL ET AL., supra note 13, at 13; MALLOY, supra note 389, at 47. 
417 12 U.S.C. §§ 321, 325, 1844; CARNELL ET AL., supra note 13, at 62; MALLOY, supra note 389, 
at 47. 
418 12 U.S.C. § 326; CARNELL ET AL., supra note 13, at 63; MALLOY, supra note 389, at 40. 
419 See 12 U.S.C. §§ 334, 338, 1828a(b) (noting that in connection with the examination of 
state member banks, the Federal Reserve may examine the affiliates of the state member 
banks to determine “the relations between [the state member banks] and their affiliates 
and the effect of such relations on the affairs of” the state member banks). 
420 Id. § 1846(a). 
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companies.421  Previously, these institutions were regulated by the 
OTS.422  Also under the Dodd-Frank Act, the Federal Reserve Board 
now has examination authority with respect to a designated nonbank 
financial company and any of its subsidiaries.423 
The FDIC was established under the Banking Act of 1933.424  The 
FDIC regulates state-chartered banks that are not members of the 
Federal Reserve System.425  These state-chartered non-member banks 
are supervised by both the FDIC and the respective states in which 
the bank is chartered.426  Under the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress grant-
ed the FDIC the additional authority to regulate state-chartered sav-
ings associations.427  Previously, the OTS was the federal regulator of 
these institutions.428 
With the abrogation of the OTS and the transferring of regulatory 
authority for federal savings associations to the Comptroller of the 
Currency,429 the Dodd-Frank Act streamlined the bank and thrift reg-
ulatory environment.  The Comptroller now regulates both national 
banks and federal thrifts.430  However, state-chartered banks and 
thrifts continue to be subject to supervision by both a federal banking 
agency (the FDIC or the Federal Reserve) and the state in which the 
institution is chartered.431 
 
421 Id. § 5412. 
422 See generally id. § 5412(b). 
423 A nonbank financial company is a company that is “predominantly engaged” in financial 
activities.  Id. § 5311(a)(4).  A company will be designated as a nonbank financial compa-
ny subject to supervision by the Federal Reserve Board based on whether “material finan-
cial distress” at the company “could pose a threat to the financial stability of the United 
States.”  Id. §§ 5323(a)(1), (b)(1). 
424 Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 12 U.S.C.); CARNELL ET AL., supra note 13, at 18. 
425 12 U.S.C. § 1820(b); CARNELL ET AL., supra note 13, at 62.  The FDIC also has the authori-
ty to examine any insured depository institution if the FDIC determines that such exami-
nation is necessary for deposit insurance purposes (so-called back-up examination au-
thority).  In addition, if the primary federal regulator of an insured depository institution 
fails to carry out necessary enforcement action, the FDIC has the power to take enforce-
ment action (so-called back-up enforcement authority).  Id.; 12 U.S.C. § 1818(t). Addi-
tionally, under the Dodd-Frank Act, the FDIC’s back-up examination authority was ex-
panded to cover nonbank financial companies supervised by the Federal Reserve Board 
and bank holding companies with $50 billion or more in assets.  Id. §§ 1820(b), 5365(a).  
The Dodd-Frank Act also expanded the FDIC’s back-up enforcement authority to cover 
any depository institution holding company.  Id. § 1818(t). 
426 Id. § 1820(h). 
427 Id. § 5412. 
428 Id. § 5412(b). 
429 See supra notes 413–15 and accompanying text. 
430 See supra notes 411–13 and accompanying text. 
431 See supra notes 417–18, 425–27 and accompanying text. 
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As discussed in Parts I and II, federal preemption applies to na-
tional banks and federal savings associations.  The next Subpart will 
focus on the lending institutions for which federal preemption does 
not apply. 
B.  Preemption Does Not Apply to State-Regulated Lending Institutions 
 In examining whether federal preemption contributed to the 
subprime mortgage crisis and the financial crisis, it is important to 
distinguish between financial institutions subject to federal preemp-
tion and those not subject to federal preemption.  Federal preemp-
tion applies to national banks and federal thrifts.432  These banking 
institutions are regulated primarily by a federal banking agency.433  
However, federal preemption does not apply to lending institutions 
regulated by the states.434  These state-regulated mortgage underwrit-
ers include state-chartered banks and thrifts, nonbank affiliates of na-
tional banks and federal thrifts under a holding company,435 and in-
dependent mortgage companies that are not affiliated with a bank or 
thrift.436  Therefore, prior to and during the financial crisis, states 
were free to enact and enforce mortgage lending laws with respect to 
these state-regulated lending institutions without the threat or impo-
sition of federal preemption.437 
However, despite the states’ power to regulate and enforce mort-
gage lending laws unimpeded by federal preemption, the “vast major-
ity” of nonprime loans, including subprime mortgages and Alt-A 
mortgages, were originated by state-regulated lending institutions.438  
 
432 See supra Parts I, II.A, II.E. 
433 As provided by the Dodd-Frank Act, national banks and federal thrifts are both regulated 
by the Comptroller of the Currency.  See supra notes 411–13 and accompanying text. 
434 Statement of John C. Dugan, supra note 339, at 5. 
435 Nonbank affiliates of national banks and federal thrifts under a holding company should 
be clearly distinguished from operating subsidiaries of national banks and federal thrifts.  
Prior to the Dodd-Frank Act, operating subsidiaries of national banks and federal thrifts 
received the same preemption of state laws that the parent national bank or federal thrift 
received.  See Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A. 550 U.S. 1, 7 (2007); 12 C.F.R. §559.3(n) 
(2003) (noting that state law applies to an operating subsidiary of a federal thrift only to 
the same extent that it applies to the parent federal thrift).  In stark contrast, federal 
preemption did not apply to the affiliates of national banks and federal thrifts under a 
holding company.  See generally Statement of John C. Dugan, supra note 339, at 6–7.  The-
se nonbank affiliates share the same parent holding company with the particular national 
bank or federal thrift.  See id. at 5, chart 1. 
436 See Statement of John C. Dugan, supra note 339, at 5.  This Article will define “independ-
ent mortgage companies” as entities that are not affiliated with a bank or thrift and are in 
the business of providing residential mortgage loans to consumers. 
437 Id. at 5–6. 
438 Id. at 8. 
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Independent data indicates that during the peak of the mortgage cri-
sis from 2005 to 2007, seventy-two percent of the nonprime loans, in-
cluding nearly seventy-eight percent of the subprime loans, were orig-
inated by lending institutions subject to state jurisdiction.439  Thus, 
federal preemption did not apply with respect to nearly three-
quarters of the nonprime loans, including nearly eighty percent of 
the subprime mortgages.440  Moreover, independent mortgage com-
panies, alone, were responsible for originating more than half of the 
nonprime loans, including nearly sixty-four percent of the subprime 
loans.441  These independent mortgage companies were regulated 
solely by the states in which the companies were operating and did 
not benefit from federal preemption.442  In contrast, during the same 
time period, national banks and their subsidiaries accounted for only 
twelve percent of the nonprime loans.443 
A study of data associated with loans made under guidelines estab-
lished by the Community Reinvestment Act (“CRA”) reveals that “on-
ly six percent of all the higher-priced loans” made to “lower income 
borrowers or neighborhoods” were extended by lenders covered by 
the CRA.444  The CRA covers insured depository institutions.445  The 
Act does not cover independent mortgage companies or nonbank af-
filiates of national banks and federal thrifts under a holding compa-
ny.  Thus, these state-regulated lenders, for which preemption does 
 
439 Id. at 8, app. B at 3–4 (acknowledging that data is derived from Loan Performance Corp., 
now owned by First American CoreLogic, Inc.); id. app. B at 4 n.2 (“The [72 percent and 
78 percent] figure[s] understate[] the actual extent of state authority, because loans 
made by affiliates of federal thrifts are [not included in these percentages] but actually 
are subject to state authority.”). 
440 See id. at 8; see also id. app. B at 4. 
441 See id. app. B at 2, 4 (“Lenders supervised only by the states originated 63.6 percent of 
subprime loans during these years, and 57.1 percent of combined nonprime 
[loans] . . . .”); see also Mason et al., supra note 11, at 803–04 (“Our analysis indicates that 
the vast majority of subprime loans were originated by lenders outside of the banking sys-
tem’s regulatory apparatus.”). 
442 Statement of John C. Dugan, supra note 339, at 4 (“[M]ortgage lenders that are not affili-
ated with banks or thrifts are subject only to state supervision.”). 
443 See id. app. B at 4 (explaining that, from 2005 to 2007, national banks and their subsidiar-
ies originated 12.1% of the nonprime loans, including 10.6% of the subprime loans, 
while federal thrifts and their subsidiaries originated 15.9% of the nonprime loans, in-
cluding 11.5% of the subprime loans).  But see id. app. B at 4 n.2  (noting that these fig-
ures are somewhat overstated because loans made by affiliates of federal thrifts are in-
cluded in the percentages for federal thrifts). 
444 U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM, A NEW FOUNDATION:  
REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION 69 (2009) (“[T]he worst abuses 
were made by firms not covered by [the] CRA.”). 
445 See generally 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901(a), 2902(2) (2012). 
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not apply, were responsible for originating ninety-four percent of all 
the higher-priced loans.446 
In examining the argument that federal preemption resulted in 
the subprime mortgage crisis and the financial crisis, it is clear that 
the argument is flawed.  As the independent data demonstrates, the 
“overwhelming majority” of subprime mortgages were originated by 
state-regulated lending institutions for which federal preemption did 
not apply.447  In particular, independent mortgage companies, those 
lending institutions regulated solely by the states, accounted for more 
than half of the subprime mortgage originations.448  As stated by Bar-
ney Frank, former Chairman of the House Committee on Financial 
Services and co-sponsor of the Dodd-Frank Act, the subprime mort-
gage crisis was caused not by the regulated banks, but instead “[by] 
loans being made outside of the regular banking system.”449  In dis-
cussing the “role of regulation,” Representative Frank observed that 
“[r]easonable regulation of mortgages by the bank . . . regulators al-
lowed the market to function in an efficient and constructive way, 
while mortgages made and sold in the unregulated sector led to the 
crisis.”450  Even state attorneys general have found that “[a]lmost all of 
the leading subprime lenders [were] mortgage companies and fi-
nance companies, not banks or direct bank subsidiaries.”451  For ex-
ample, one particularly notorious independent mortgage company 
held a significant share of the subprime mortgage market.  According 
to the Washington State Department of Financial Institutions, 
“Ameriquest Mortgage Company was the largest privately held retail 
 
446 Mason et al., supra note 11, at 782, 791. 
447 Id. at 782; see also id. at 787–88 (“The overwhelming majority of instances of predatory 
lending involved loans originated by institutions not subject to preemption, but instead 
under the purview of state laws.”). 
448 See supra notes 441–42 and accompanying text. 
449 Representative Barney Frank, Chairman of the House Financial Services Committee, 
Speech at  National Press Club:  The “Loan Arrangers” Will Not Ride Again (July 27, 
2009), available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rep-barney-frank/the-loan-arrangers-
will-n_b_247264.html. 
450 Barney Frank, Op-Ed., Lessons of the Subprime Crisis, BOSTON GLOBE, July 14, 2007, 
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2007/09/14/less
ons_of_the_subprime_crisis. 
451 Julie L. Williams & Michael S. Bylsma, Federal Preemption and Federal Banking Agency Re-
sponses to Predatory Lending, 59 BUS. LAW. 1193 n.29 (2004) (“Based on consumer com-
plaints received, as well as investigations and enforcement actions undertaken by the At-
torneys General, predatory lending abuses are largely confined to the subprime mortgage 
lending market and to non-depository institutions.” (quoting Brief of Amicus Curiae State 
Attorneys Gen. in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and in Sup-
port of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Nat’l Home Equity Mortgage Ass’n 
v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 271 F. Supp. 2d 264 (D.D.C. 2003) (No. CIV.A.02-
2506(GK)), 2003 WL 24210106, at *8)). 
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mortgage lender in America and the largest subprime lender by vol-
ume.”452 
Moreover, evidence indicates that state-regulated subprime lend-
ers, in particular, independent mortgage companies regulated solely 
by the states, engaged in abusive lending practices.453  For example, 
despite the ability of the states to regulate and enforce state lending 
laws unhampered by federal preemption, Ameriquest was permitted 
to engage in “unlawful mortgage lending practices from January 1, 
1999 through December 31, 2005” before entering into a multistate 
settlement agreement with forty-nine states in January 2006.454  
Ameriquest could have applied for a charter to become a national 
bank or a federal thrift and, thus, receive the benefit of federal 
preemption for its multistate mortgage lending operations.  Yet, 
Ameriquest chose to remain an independent mortgage company 
regulated by the states.  Clearly, Ameriquest did not view federal 
preemption as a means of avoiding compliance with state law nor was 
preemption involved in any way in the predatory lending activities of 
this state-regulated mortgage company. 
Perhaps even more revealing is the fact that a number of large 
bank holding companies chose to establish their subprime mortgage 
lending operations in the affiliate of the national bank (for which 
preemption did not apply) rather than in the national bank (for 
which preemption did apply).455  One could query why these bank 
holding companies chose to place their subprime mortgage lending 
operations in an entity that did not benefit from federal preemption.  
Perhaps the level of regulation differed, making state-regulated 
mortgage lending institutions more attractive to the subprime mort-
gage market.  Whatever the reason, it is clear that bank holding com-
panies were not relying on federal preemption to shield their sub-
prime mortgage lending institutions from state law.  Instead, state 
laws, including any laws the states chose to enact with respect to regu-
 
452 Ameriquest Settlement Facts, WASH. STATE DEP’T OF FIN. INSTS., http://www.dfi.wa.gov/
cs/ameriquest_facts.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2013). 
453 U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY & U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING & URBAN DEV., supra note 399, at 13 
(“[A]n unscrupulous subset of these subprime . . . lenders (often those not subject to 
federal banking supervision) . . . engage[d] in abusive lending practices that strip[ped] 
borrowers’ home equity and place[d] them at increased risk of foreclosure.”). 
454 AMERIQUEST MULTISTATE SETTLEMENT (Mar. 29, 2013), 
http://ameriquestmultistatesettlement.com.  
455 Statement of John C. Dugan, supra note 339, at 6–7; see also id. at 7 (“For example, HSBC, 
Citigroup, Wells Fargo, and Countrywide (when it owned a national bank) conducted 
most of their subprime mortgage lending in holding company affiliates of national banks 
that were . . . subject to . . . state supervision.”). 
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lation, supervision, and enforcement, were fully applicable to these 
state-regulated affiliates of national banks.456 
Moreover, the power of states to regulate the affiliates of national 
banks under a holding company has been made explicit by Con-
gress.457  The Bank Holding Company Act “expressly empowers states 
to regulate bank holding companies and their subsidiaries.”458  Thus, 
states have the statutory authority, granted by Congress, to regulate 
the affiliates of national banks under a bank holding company.  In 
contrast, the Savings and Loan Holding Company Act is silent regard-
ing the power of states to regulate savings and loan holding compa-
nies and their subsidiaries.459  However, the Second Circuit has inter-
preted “Congress’s silence . . . as implicit approval of state 
regulation.”460  Thus, states also have the authority to regulate affili-
ates of federal thrifts under a holding company. 
Additionally, independent data indicates that, between 2000 and 
2009, approximately 240 federally regulated banks converted from a 
federal charter to a state charter.461  Of this amount, roughly twelve 
percent converted to a state charter to avoid federal regulatory ac-
tions.462  According to another study, between 2000 and 2011, almost 
300 national banks converted to a state charter while only ninety-two 
state-chartered banks converted to a nationally chartered bank.463  
The apparent reason for the conversions from a national charter to a 
state charter was the “pursuit of leniency” a state regulator would be 
expected to provide in comparison to a federal regulator.464  Thus, 
many federally chartered banks converted to state-regulated institu-
 
456 Id. at 6 (“[T]he overwhelming majority of subprime lending was done outside of national 
banks in entities that were subject to state law . . . .”). 
457 See 12 U.S.C. § 1846(a) (2012) (“No provision of this chapter shall be construed as pre-
venting any State from exercising such powers and jurisdiction which it now has or may 
hereafter have with respect to companies, banks, bank holding companies, and subsidiar-
ies thereof.”). 
458 Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Brown, 806 F.2d 399, 410 (2d Cir. 1986) (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1846). 
459 See id. (“[T]he [Savings and Loan Holding Company Act] does not expressly allow regula-
tion of S&L holding companies by states . . . .”). 
460 Id. (basing its interpretation upon Congress’s indication that “it was aware at the time of 
the [Savings and Loan Holding Company Act’s] passage that states already regulated sav-
ings and loan holding companies and their subsidiaries”). 
461 Binyamin Appelbaum, By Switching Their Charters, Banks Skirt Supervision, WASH. POST, Jan. 
22, 2009, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2009-01-22/business/36867887_1_national
-charters-regulators-state-charters. 
462 Id. 
463 Barbara A. Rehm, Two-Decade Trend Squeezes Choice from Dual Banking System, AM. BANKER 
(Oct. 26, 2011, 3:00 PM), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/176_208/national-
banks-community-policymakers-charter-1043546-1.html. 
464 See Appelbaum, supra note 461. 
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tions in an effort to avoid federal regulation, notwithstanding the 
state lending laws that would be fully applicable to these newly con-
verted state banks.465  Evidently, these banks were not relying on fed-
eral preemption to avoid compliance with state law. 
As demonstrated, the doctrine of federal “preemption did not and 
does not prevent regulation” of independent mortgage companies.466  
Nor does federal preemption prevent regulation of other state-
regulated lending institutions, including affiliates of national banks 
and federal thrifts under a holding company and state-chartered 
banks and thrifts.467  Nevertheless, nearly three-quarters of the 
nonprime loans, including nearly eighty percent of the subprime 
loans, were originated by state-regulated lending institutions for 
which federal preemption did not apply.468  State-regulated lenders 
also were responsible for originating ninety-four percent of all the 
higher-priced loans.469  Moreover, state-regulated subprime lenders 
engaged in abusive and unlawful lending practices, despite the un-
hampered ability of the states to regulate and enforce state anti-
predatory lending laws against these lenders.470 
The supposed link between federal preemption and the subprime 
mortgage crisis is even more tenuous when one considers the choice 
of bank holding companies to place their mortgage lending business 
in the affiliate of the national bank rather than in the national 
bank,471 knowing federal preemption would not apply to the affiliate 
of the national bank.  Clearly, bank holding companies were not rely-
ing on federal preemption to shield their mortgage lending subsidi-
aries from state laws.  Rather, state laws were fully applicable to these 
state-regulated mortgage lenders.472  The argument against federal 
preemption is further weakened by the choice of nationally chartered 
banks to convert to state charters despite the applicability of state 
lending laws to state-regulated institutions.473  Similar to the bank 
holding companies, these banks were not depending upon federal 
 
465 See supra notes 434–35 and accompanying text. 
466 Dodd-Frank Implementation, supra note 3, at 43,554. 
467 See supra notes 434–37 and accompanying text. 
468 See supra notes 439–40 and accompanying text. 
469 See supra notes 444–46 and accompanying text. 
470 See supra notes 434–37, 453–54 and accompanying text. 
471 Statement of John C. Dugan, supra note 339, at 6–7 (“[S]everal large bank holding com-
panies conducted all or most of their subprime mortgage lending in nonbank subsidiar-
ies rather than their national bank subsidiaries.”). 
472 Id. at 6. 
473 See supra notes 461–65 and accompanying text. 
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preemption to protect their mortgage lending activities from state 
laws. 
Even granting that national banks and federal thrifts engaged in 
nonprime lending, albeit to a minimal extent,474 this fact does not 
support the argument that federal preemption led to the subprime 
mortgage crisis and the financial crisis.  Obviously, state lending laws 
did not prohibit nonprime mortgage lending, in and of itself, as evi-
denced by the significant percentage of subprime loans and Alt-A 
loans originated by state-regulated mortgage lenders.475  Thus, the 
origination of nonprime loans by national banks and federal thrifts 
does not implicate federal preemption as a contributing cause of the 
subprime mortgage crisis and the financial crisis.  There is no nexus 
between federal preemption and the subprime mortgage crisis. 
As an illustration, suppose the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (“FEMA”) is responsible for dam safety on waterways used for 
interstate commerce, and New York State is responsible for dam safe-
ty on reservoirs in the state used for drinking water.  There are ten 
dams located in the state.  Two of the dams are regulated by FEMA 
and the other eight dams are regulated by the state.  The FEMA regu-
lated dams benefit from federal preemption of state laws.  The other 
eight dams are fully subject to state laws.  The state experiences a se-
vere storm and a hundred-year flood.  All ten dams suffer breaches 
during the flood which cause massive property damage downstream.  
Would it be reasonable to blame the property damage on the 
preemption of state laws?  I would argue that federal preemption did 
not contribute to the damage.  Had the two FEMA-regulated dams 
been subject to state laws, the result would have been the same.  The 
storm still would have occurred, the dams still would have been 
breached, and the massive property damage still would have been suf-
fered. 
Likewise, the argument that federal preemption is to blame for 
the financial crisis is a fallacy.  Federal preemption did not lead to the 
subprime mortgage crisis and the financial crisis, nor did federal 
preemption contribute to the crises. 
The next Part will discuss the supposed benefits of eliminating 
federal preemption versus the costs. 
 
474 See supra note 443 and accompanying text. 
475 See supra notes 439–41 and accompanying text. 
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IV.  BENEFITS VERSUS COSTS OF ELIMINATING FEDERAL PREEMPTION 
 As discussed in Part II.A.1, the meaning of the preemption provi-
sions of the Dodd-Frank Act was debated in a number of letters 
among the executive and legislative branches of the government.476  
In response to a letter by the Treasury Department to the Comptrol-
ler of the Currency, Senators Carper and Warner indicated that alt-
hough the Administration supported the elimination of federal 
preemption, Congress “rejected” that position.477  While the Treasury 
Department, in its letter to the Comptroller, did not explicitly advo-
cate elimination of federal preemption, the Treasury argued for a 
narrowing of the preemption standard.478  Thus, fewer state consumer 
financial laws would be preempted under the Treasury’s interpreta-
tion. 
While the elimination of federal preemption, or even a narrowing 
of the preemption standard, may be considered a curiously Federalist 
position for a Democratic administration,479 the overarching policy 
behind the position is clearly to protect consumers by ensuring the 
applicability of State consumer financial laws to national banks.  This 
position is consistent with a liberal viewpoint.480  While protecting 
consumers is certainly a worthy public policy goal shared by the au-
thor of this Article, this goal would not be furthered by the elimina-
tion of federal preemption.  As discussed in Part III.B, national banks 
and federal thrifts, those banking institutions for which federal 
preemption applies, were not responsible for originating the vast ma-
jority of nonprime mortgages, including subprime mortgages and Alt-
A mortgages.481  Rather, state-regulated lenders were responsible for 
underwriting the bulk of these nonprime mortgages.482  Moreover, 
state-regulated lenders, in particular, independent mortgage compa-
 
476 See discussion supra Part II.A.1. 
477 Letter from Carper and Warner, supra note 120, at 1 (“While we understand that the posi-
tion of the Administration was to eliminate federal preemption for national banks, the 
fact is that Congress did not accept that position.”). 
478 See Comment Letter from George W. Madison, supra note 125, at 1–2 (“We believe 
that . . . Congress intended that a state consumer financial law may be preempted only if 
the law ‘prevents or significantly interferes’ with the exercise of a national bank’s pow-
ers . . . .”). 
479 See, e.g., Gregory M. Dickinson, An Empirical Study of Obstacle Preemption in the Supreme 
Court, 89 NEB. L. REV. 682 (2011) (“Preemption defies traditional conservative—liberal 
alignment, as conservatives are torn between support of federalism and capitalist efficien-
cy, and liberals are torn between support of strong national governance and multiplicity 
of legal remedies.”). 
480 See id. at 685–86. 
481 See supra note 443 and accompanying text. 
482 See supra notes 438–41 and accompanying text. 
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nies, engaged in predatory lending practices.483  Federal preemption 
did not apply to these state-regulated lending institutions.484  Thus, 
the supposed benefit of eliminating federal preemption—the protec-
tion of consumers through the enhanced applicability of State con-
sumer financial laws—is simply a fallacy. 
At the same time, the costs of eliminating federal preemption 
would be staggering to the banking industry.485  These costs are not 
only measured in dollars, but also in the public policy issues that 
would ensue.486  In setting forth the preemption provisions in the 
Dodd-Frank Act, Congress desired to provide “certainty” to both con-
sumers and the banking industry regarding the standard for preemp-
tion.487  This certainty would be greatly diminished if federal preemp-
tion was eliminated.  For example, if federal preemption was 
eliminated or narrowed within the Barnett standard, it would create 
“great uncertainty” for the banking industry.488  National banks would 
need to review each of the products and services offered on a nation-
wide basis to determine whether the bank was in compliance with 
“hundreds of differing state and local laws.”489  Undoubtedly, litiga-
tion would follow in an attempt to determine the parameters of the 
new standard and whether national banks were in compliance with 
that new standard in all fifty states.490  Moreover, complying with the 
differing standards of individual states may “require a bank to deter-
mine which state’s law governs—the law of the state where a person 
provides a product or service; the law of the home state of the bank; 
or the law of the state where the customer is located.”491  Any disa-
 
483 See supra notes 453–54 and accompanying text. 
484 Statement of John C. Dugan, supra note 339, at 5. 
485 See, e.g., Alan Untereiner, The Defense of Preemption:  A View From the Trenches, 84 TUL. L. 
REV. 1257, 1262 (2010) (“Th[e] multiplicity of government actors below the federal level 
virtually ensures that, in the absence of federal preemption, businesses with national op-
erations that serve national markets will be subject to complicated, overlapping, and 
sometimes even conflicting legal regimes.  These overlapping regulations have the poten-
tial to impose onerous burdens on interstate commerce and to disrupt and undermine 
federal regulatory programs.”). 
486 Letter from Carper & Warner, supra note 120, at 3. 
487 156 CONG. REC. S5889 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (statement of Sen. Johnson). 
488 Letter from Carper & Warner, supra note 120, at 3. 
489 Id. 
490 See id. (“There can be no doubt this would lead to years of litigation before the new 
standard was finalized in a way that enabled national banks (and state banks chartered by 
states with wild card statutes) to plan and deliver products and services without significant 
legal risk.”). 
491 John C. Dugan, Comptroller of the Currency, Remarks before Women in Housing and 
Finance:  The Need to Preserve Uniform National Standards for National Banks 7–8 
(Sept. 24, 2009). 
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greement with the bank’s determination would most likely result in 
“litigation in multiple jurisdictions.”492 
Ultimately, the uncertainty that would ensue as a result of the 
elimination or even the narrowing of the Barnett standard would 
cause banks to incur significant costs.493  Specifically, banks would 
need to review the state and local laws in all fifty states to determine 
compliance, adjust product development and the provision of ser-
vices wherever necessary in the particular jurisdictions, and continu-
ally monitor the differing state and local laws to maintain compli-
ance.494  These “disparate standards would impose significant 
compliance costs on banks seeking to operate across state lines.”495  
Even Senator Elizabeth Warren, a well-known consumer protection 
advocate, has acknowledged that “[i]n an era of interstate banking, 
uniform regulation of consumer credit products at the federal level 
may well be more efficient than a litany of consumer protection rules 
that vary from state to state.”496 
As a result of the increased cost of compliance, “some portion of 
these costs” will likely be passed along to consumers.497  These costs, 
along with the inevitable litigation costs, will likely reduce the availa-
bility of banking products and services.498  At a time when the econo-
my depends on the ability of the banking industry to lend to consum-
ers in need of credit, an increase in costs to banks and a resulting 
decrease in banking services could have a devastating effect on the 
economy.499  Such an effect is entirely unnecessary, especially when 
the benefits of eliminating federal preemption are not readily appar-
ent.  Accordingly, this analysis leads to the conclusion that the costs 
of eliminating federal preemption would far outweigh the supposed 
benefits. 
 
492 Id. at 8. 
493 Letter from Carper and Warner, supra note 120, at 3. 
494 COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, THE IMPORTANCE OF PRESERVING A SYSTEM OF NATIONAL 
STANDARDS FOR NATIONAL BANKS 15 (2010), http://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/
speeches/2009/pub-speech-2009-112.pdf; see also Mason et al., supra note 11, at 802 
(“Eliminating preemption would create a complex regulatory environment where banks 
are forced to operate under a patchwork of state regulations.”). 
495 Mason et al., supra note 11, at 802. 
496 Elizabeth Warren & Oren Bar-Gill, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 83 (2008). 
497 COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 494, at 15. 
498 See Letter from Carper & Warner, supra note 120, at 3. 
499 See id. (“This uncertainty would clearly increase the cost and decrease the availability of 
bank services, including lending, at a time of economic difficulty when we can least afford 
it.”). 
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CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this Article is to explore the doctrine of preemp-
tion in the context of banking and to provide a critical examination 
of the preemption reforms in the Dodd-Frank Act.  While this Article 
analyzes the impact of these changes on the doctrine of preemption, 
the ultimate effect of many of the reform provisions is yet to be seen.  
Notably, although many aspects of the preemption doctrine were al-
tered by the statute, the preemption standard remains unchanged. 
This Article also addresses the fallacy that federal preemption of 
state laws resulted in the subprime mortgage crisis and the financial 
crisis.  Based on independent data and an analysis of the preemption 
doctrine, this Article argues that federal preemption did not contrib-
ute to the crises.  Finally, this Article examines the costs of eliminat-
ing federal preemption and requiring national banks and federal 
thrifts to adhere to the differing laws of fifty states.  Based on this 
analysis, it is clear that the costs of eliminating federal preemption far 
outweigh the ostensible benefits. 
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